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This thesis documents the development and demonstration of an assessment method for 
analysing earthquake-related damage to concrete waste water gravity pipes in Christchurch, 
New Zealand, following the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES). The method 
is intended to be internationally adaptable to assist territorial local authorities with 
improving lifelines infrastructure disaster impact assessment and improvements in 
resilience. This is achieved through the provision of high-resolution, localised damage data, 
which demonstrate earthquake impacts along the pipe length. The insights gained will assist 
decision making and the prioritisation of resources following earthquake events to quickly 
and efficiently restore network function and reduce community impacts.  
The method involved obtaining a selection of 55 reinforced concrete gravity waste water 
pipes with available Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) inspection footage filmed before and 
after the CES. The pipes were assessed by reviewing the recordings, and damage was 
mapped to the nearest metre along the pipe length using Geographic Information Systems. 
An established, systematic coding process was used for reporting the nature and severity of 
the observed damage, and to differentiate between pre-existing and new damage resulting 
from the CES. The damage items were overlaid with geospatial data such as Light Detection 
and Ranging (LiDAR)-derived ground deformation data, Liquefaction Resistance Index data 
and seismic ground motion data (Peak Ground acceleration and Peak Ground Velocity) to 
identify potential relationships between these parameters and pipe performance. 
Initial assessment outcomes for the pipe selection revealed that main pipe joints and lateral 
connections were more vulnerable than the pipe body during a seismic event. Smaller 
diameter pipes may also be more vulnerable than larger pipes during a seismic event. 
Obvious differential ground movement resulted in increased local damage observations in 
many cases, however this was not obvious for all pipes. Pipes with older installation ages 
exhibited more overall damage prior to a seismic event, which is likely attributable to 
increased chemical and biological deterioration. However, no evidence was found relating 
pipe age to performance during a seismic event. No evidence was found linking levels of 
pre-CES damage in a pipe with subsequent seismic performance, and seismic performance 
with liquefaction resistance or magnitude of seismic ground motion. 
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The results reported are of limited application due to the small demonstration sample size, 
but reveal the additional level of detail and insight possible using the method presented in 
this thesis over existing assessment methods, especially in relation to high resolution 
variations along the length of the pipe such as localised ground deformations evidenced by 
LiDAR. 
The results may be improved by studying a larger and more diverse sample pool, 
automating data collection and input processes in order to improve efficiency and consider 
additional input such as pipe dip and cumulative damage over a large distance.  
The method is dependent on comprehensive and accurate pre-event CCTV assessments and 
LIDAR data so that post-event data could be compared. It is proposed that local territorial 
authorities should prioritise acquiring this information as a first important step towards 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Lifeline infrastructure provides the basic services required for the operation of society. 
These include telecommunications, transport, water and energy. In the aftermath of a 
disaster, decisions need to be made urgently to alleviate the strain suddenly imposed on 
available resources. Therefore, a robust and resilient system of lifelines is crucial for the 
ability of a region to recover from traumatic events.   
This thesis presents a detailed method for assessing seismic impacts on reinforced concrete 
gravity waste water pipes based on the performance of infrastructure in Christchurch City, 
New Zealand, during the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES). This 
assessment characterises specific modes of failure and causative factors, in order to 
contribute to development of a risk and resilience framework for this critical infrastructure 
lifeline system within New Zealand and elsewhere. 
This Chapter presents an overview of key topics and the rationale for undertaking this study 
including a discussion of risk and resilience to infrastructure with a New Zealand context, 
and the suitability of using data from Christchurch as a case study towards understanding 
the general seismic performance of reinforced concrete waste water pipes. Following this 
review, the objectives of the project are presented. 
1.1 Understanding risk and resilience 
The primary objective of this thesis project is to contribute to increased resilience of waste 
water lifeline infrastructure. Building infrastructure resilience starts with the understanding 
of disaster risk.  
The components of disaster risk in the current New Zealand risk management framework 
are derived from definitions in the United Nations National Disaster Risk Assessment, which 
is a set of guidelines produced in 2016 by the United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), under its “Words into Action” initiative to support 
implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 on a 
national level. This framework is currently the most encompassing international accord on 
disaster risk reduction in place (UNISDR, 2018). 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
2 
 
The Sendai Framework aims for the “substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, 
livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental 
assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries” (UNISDR, 2018). In order to 
achieve this, seven global targets have been agreed between member states (UNISDR, 2018): 
1. “Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower average per 
100,000 global mortality between 2020-2030 compared to 2005-2015; 
2. Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to 
lower the average global figure per 100,000 between 2020-2030 compared to 2005-
2015; 
3. Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product by 
2030; 
4. Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic 
services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing 
their resilience by 2030; 
5. Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk 
reduction strategies by 2020; 
6. Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through 
adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for 
implementation of the framework by 2030; 
7. Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning 
systems and disaster risk information and assessments to the people by 2030.” 
Lifeline infrastructures such as waste water networks are fundamental to public health and 
safety, the local economy, and the basic operation of society. Therefore, improving general 
resilience for lifeline infrastructure directly supports the achievement of goals 2, 3, and 4 of 
the Sendai Framework. Addressing these Sendai targets in the context of waste water 
systems also aligns with the 2015-2030 Sustainable Development Goals, specifically Goal 6 
that addresses ensuring access to clean water and sanitation for all (UNISDR, 2019). 
The disaster risk concept adopted by the UNISDR defines risk based on the interaction 
between likelihood and impact, and the interaction of the key components of hazard, 
exposure, and vulnerability. Hazard refers to a phenomenon (whether natural or man-made) 
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causing harm. Exposure defines the spatial (and possibly temporal) extent of potentially 
affected communities and assets in hazard-prone areas, and vulnerability is based on the 
attributes of the exposed communities and their assets that affect their susceptibility to the 
hazard (UNISDR, 2018). 
The interaction of the risk components results in varying levels of impact directly or 
indirectly affecting a system or community. A summary chart showing the risk components 
and impacts is provided in Figure 1-1. The impact may or may not be quantifiable, due to 
the differing perceptions of risk amongst different affected communities (New Zealand 
Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2018) and may directly or indirectly affect the community. In 
the case of wastewater networks, direct impacts include damage to infrastructure, and 
indirect impacts could include loss of income for businesses from requiring customers to use 
portable toilets while repairs are undertaken. The latter is also an example of a quantifiable 
impact, while health risks due to water borne disease may be difficult to quantify. 
 
Figure 1-1. Disaster risk drivers and impacts (UNISDR, 2017) 
 
New Zealand follows the principles and guidelines of risk management provided in the 
standard AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009, which is identical to and reproduced from the 
international standard ISO 31000. The risk management process is illustrated in Figure 1-2. 
and starts with establishing the context in order to define the scope of assessment; for 
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example, engaging with stakeholders and defining acceptable criteria for decision making. 
This is followed by the assessment of risk, which involves scoping the hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability and assessing each point of interaction of the various disaster risk components 
for the purpose of managing the risk. The final stage is risk treatment, which could include 
methods to reduce affected population numbers or spatial extent of exposed assets. 
Throughout the process, communication and consultation with stakeholders is 
recommended, along with consistent monitoring and review of the process. 
 
Figure 1-2. The risk management framework (centre) is the result of the mandate and 
commitment of the risk management authority which is based on the 11 risk management 
principles (left). A framework is then designed and implemented using the risk management 
process (right), which is continuously improved through monitoring and review (Standards 
New Zealand, 2009) 
 
Resilience is defined by the UNISDR as “the ability of a system, community or society 
exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from 
the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation 
and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management” 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
5 
 
(UNISDR, 2018). With regards to lifelines infrastructure, resilience can be understood as the 
state of being able to avoid utility supply outages, or maintain or quickly restore service 
delivery when hazardous events occur (New Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017). 
Resilience can be separated into two aspects: absorption and adaptability. These represent, 
respectively, the impact felt by a community, and the speed of recovery following a 
traumatic event. Both aspects require adequate management to increase resilience as a 
whole. The differences between a high-resilience community and that of a low-resilience 
community is illustrated in Figure 1-3. 
 
Figure 1-3. The differences in resilience between a high resilience and low resilience 
community, the low resilience community feels more impact upon initial stress and recovers 
slower, resulting in a weaker post-event community (New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management, 2018) 
 
A comprehensive treatment of infrastructure resilience and its relationship to risk 
management, and the scales, dimensions and principles of infrastructure resilience, has 
been presented in the International Infrastructure Management Manual (IIMM) (Institute of 
Public Works Engineering et al., 2015).  Decision making bodies typically choose to take a 
risk-based or resilience-based approach to managing infrastructure. The approaches are 
compared below in Table 1-1. 
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Table 1-1. Risk vs resilience-based approach to infrastructure management (Institute of 
Public Works Engineering et al., 2015) 
Risk Approach Resilience Approach 
(likelihood × consequence), known hazards, risk 
management/mitigation 
 
Events that are unpredictable, low-
probability high consequence 
Should consider the degree of certainty related to the 
hazard likelihood and range of potential consequences. 
If there is significant uncertainty, a ‘resilience 
approach” should be used as well 
 
Consideration of over-design events. What 
happens when this occurs? What 
procedures are in place to manage? 
Consideration of multiple interdependencies related to 
a piece of infrastructure and ways to reduce or manage 
these more efficiently. Have range of potential failure 
possibilities/modes (across interdependencies) been 
considered and planned for? 
 
Given the criticality of a specific system or 
asset, should further investment be made 
to manage failure due to an unspecified 
cause (e.g. by providing redundant 
systems, safe-failure approaches) 
Should focus on prioritising risk reduction for those 
assessed as being high 
 
Should focus on measuring attributes of 
resilient systems 
 
A risk-based approach would consider the likelihood of threats and consequences. It would 
require quantifying the risk of failure of each component in the network.  The goal is to 
identify the component’s contribution to the overall risk and determining whether one 
component poses substantially more risk than others, which then becomes the basis of 
quantitative benchmarks for the system (Institute of Public Works Engineering et al., 2015).  
In contrast, a resilience-based approach aims to prepare the system to recover quickly from 
various known and unknown threats. Resilience is an inherent property of the system itself 
and does not require an assessment of risk, but the attention is placed on how the system 
can adapt, absorb and recover from any event. This has implications with regards to capital 
investment; a risk-based approach for managing a waste water network would require 
significant expenditure of resources on scoping the hazard, for example the annual 
exceedance probability of a design earthquake or liquefaction potential of the surrounding 
soil. A resilience-based approach does not require expenditure of resources to identify the 
hazard, and directly expends resources to prepare for breakages in the network and identify 
costs required to provide redundant flow paths. 
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Both approaches have advantages. A risk-based approach is more comprehensive and the 
highest risk component is usually identified for improvement, but the nature of certain 
hazards such as earthquakes are low probability and high impact, therefore expending 
significant resources to upgrade the weakest component in the network to meet the 
demands of these events may be prohibitively expensive in terms of both initial capital and 
maintenance costs, not to mention the hazard scoping costs discussed previously. A 
resilience-based approach may allow for planned failure of these highest risk components, 
provided an alternate solution is supplied, which in many instances may be significantly 
cheaper to realise. 
The IIMM presents infrastructure resilience in terms of scale, which may be either human-
based or physical-based. These are shown below in Table 1-2: 
Table 1-2. Scales of resilience (Institute of Public Works Engineering et al., 2015) 
Scale Level Example 
Human Neighbourhood Provision of social infrastructure, such as a community hall or fire station 
 Country National arrangements for welfare support following a major disaster 
Physical Asset Robustness of materials and structures e.g. bridge components 
 Network/System Provision of asset redundancy across a network i.e. network diversity 
 System of Systems 
(National) 
Assessment of the interdependencies between sectors, such as 
telecommunications on electricity and fuel 
 
With regards to the waste water network, the provision of portable toilets serving a small 
local population following an earthquake is an example of human scale resilience at the 
neighbourhood level, which absorbs the pressure for broken sewage pipes to be fixed and 
operational in the shortest amount of time. The ductility of a buried reinforced concrete 
pipe is an example of physical scale resilience at the asset level, as the pipe, which is a single 
physical asset, can deform a larger amount before cracks start appearing and leakages occur. 
Resilience is also defined based on a technical or organisation dimension. This is shown in 
Table 1-3. Again, using examples specifically relating to the resilience of the waste water 
network, developing training materials for standards for pipe assessment is an example of 
organisational resilience based on the principle of change readiness, as this results in a 
highly trained workface able to assess damaged pipes and recommend repairs following an 
earthquake. Using a cement mix with higher compressive strength in the design of 
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reinforced concrete pipes is an example of technical resilience based on the principle of 
robustness, as this means the components of the network, i.e. the pipes, are able to 
withstand a larger stress before loss of function. 
Table 1-3. Dimensions of resilience (Institute of Public Works Engineering et al., 2015) 
Dimension Principle Definition & Justification 
Technical 
Robustness Strength, or the ability of elements and other units of analysis to 
withstand a given level of stress or demand without suffering 
degradation or loss of function. 
Redundancy/ 
Back up 
The extent to which elements, systems, other infrastructure 
units, or reserve capacity exist that are substitutable i.e. capable 
of satisfying functional requirements in the event of disruption, 
degradation or loss of functionality. 
Modularity/ 
Flexibility 
System components have enough independence that damage or 
failure of one part or component of a system has a low 
probability of inducing failure of other similar or related 
components in the system. This may favour decentralised over 
centralised systems. Can also mean constructing systems that can 
be simply modified and improved/added to or strengthened. 
Relates closely to ‘safe-to-fail’ principle below. 
Safe-To-Fail The extent to which design approaches are used, allowing (where 
relevant) controlled, planned failure during unpredicted 
conditions, recognising the possibility of failure can never be 
eliminated. This may involve novel approaches to design, to 




The ability to sense and anticipate hazards, identify problems and 
failures, and to develop a forewarning of disruption threats and 
their effects through sourcing a diversity of views, increasing 
alertness an, and understanding social vulnerability. This also 
involves ability to adapt (either via redesign or planning) and 
learn from the success or failure of previous adaptive strategies 
and the capacity to mobilise resources (financial or human) when 
conditions exist that threaten to disrupt some element, system, 
or other unit. 
Networks The ability to establish relationships, mutual aid arrangements 
and regulatory partnerships, understand interconnectedness and 
vulnerabilities across all aspects of supply chains and distribution 




The ability to develop an organisational mind-set/culture of 
enthusiasm for challenges, agility, flexibility, adaptive capacity, 
innovation and taking opportunities 
 
A table of assessed interdependencies of infrastructure following a disaster in New Zealand 
was presented in the National Vulnerability Assessment – Stage 1 and is provided in Figure 
1.4. The waste water sector is assessed to be highly dependent on the fuel, roading, 
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telecommunications and electricity sectors, while most other sectors have low dependence 
on the waste water sector, other than air transport which has medium dependence. 
 
Figure 1-4. Lifelines Sector Interdependency Matrix during / post disaster event colour coded 
to show that the larger the number the greater the interdependency between the sectors 
compared (New Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017) 
1.2 Infrastructure Resilience in New Zealand 
The Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002 is the legislative 
framework for managing hazards in New Zealand “in a way that contributes to the social, 
economic, cultural and environmental well-being and safety of the public and to the 
protection of property” (New Zealand Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2018). With regards to 
lifelines, section 60: Duties of Lifeline Utilities states that “every lifeline utility must ensure 
that it is able to function to the fullest possible extent, even though this may be at a reduced 
level, during and after an emergency” while they must also “participate in the development 
of the national civil defence emergency management strategy and civil defence emergency 
management plans” (New Zealand Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2018). 
A National Disaster Resilience Strategy was proposed in 2018, the third strategy on 
emergency management under the CDEM Act that builds upon knowledge gained from 16 
years of lessons since the Act came into effect (New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and 
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Emergency Management, 2018). The strategy signals New Zealand’s commitment to 
improving the resilience of the country’s infrastructure in accordance to the 2015-2010 
Sendai Framework, especially the resilience of lifelines infrastructure. 
In New Zealand, the vulnerabilities and interdependencies of lifelines systems are reviewed 
by the New Zealand Lifelines Council (NZLC) and 16 regional lifelines groups. The NZLC is 
currently undertaking a project known as the New Zealand Lifelines Infrastructure 
Vulnerability Assessment, which reflects an overarching intent for increased resilience of 
New Zealand infrastructure. The first of three stages was completed in September 2017. The 
overall goal of the project is to provide government and industry with a strategic 
understanding of nationally significant infrastructure, its vulnerability and resilience to 
hazards, and strategies to mitigate risks to a nationally agreed ‘acceptable’ level (New 
Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017). 
The New Zealand Lifelines Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment has identified various 
barriers to resilience in the country. Many of New Zealand’s critical infrastructure assets are 
ageing and vulnerable, which will require extensive resources to strengthen and or maintain. 
Disaster recovery is often underestimated in terms of time and cost, and not factored into 
investment decision-making. Many organisations and property owners aim for the lowest-
cost option instead of the most resilient solution, as the process of building resilience is 
perceived by many as limiting economic development and business growth (New Zealand 
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 2018). 
In the case of the waste water pipe network, older brittle pipe materials are slowly being 
replaced with more resilient, ductile materials. However, progress to date has been slow 
due to competing demands for infrastructure investment in other sectors, with many 
damaged pipes being re-lined to extend their use instead of being replaced as a more 
economic option (New Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017). 
Waste water systems are also increasingly being managed remotely by telemetry. Modern 
asset management systems depend on extensive computing and software resources, so in 
this way they are dependent on the electricity and telecommunications networks (New 
Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017). 
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1.3 Relevance of Christchurch as a case study 
During late 2010-2011 the city of Christchurch in New Zealand was affected by a series of 
devastating earthquakes, known as the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES). The CES has 
“generated one of the most comprehensive databases in the world” regarding seismic 
impacts on urban environments (Cubrinovski et al., 2014).  
Information available to researchers includes detailed and comprehensive seismic ground 
motion databases containing Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) and Peak Ground Velocity 
(PGV) data, mapped liquefaction severity, ground deformation evidenced by Light Detection 
and Ranging (LiDAR) data, and geotechnical data currently archived in the New Zealand 
Geotechnical Database (New Zealand Geotechnical Database, 2012). 
Following the CES, the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) was 
formed as an alliance consisting of the Christchurch City Council (CCC), New Zealand 
Transport Agency (NZTA) and Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) together 
with five private companies to repair horizontal infrastructure including the waste water 
network (SCIRT Learning Legacy, 2019). SCIRT compiled detailed damage and repair logs of 
the waste water pipes and undertook Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) damage surveys. 
Approximately half of all waste water pipes across Christchurch city were subject to CCTV 
surveys following the CES, many of which were also surveyed before the CES. These surveys 
provide high-resolution damage information along individual pipes. Other investigation 
methods were also undertaken such as manhole level surveys, pole camera surveys and 
pipe profilometer surveys (Liu et al., 2013). The contractors conducting this work were 
required to record location coordinates, repair date, repair length, damage cause, repair 
type, material, manufacturer, and details of the contractor themselves during inspections. 
The comprehensive assessment reports compiled throughout the SCIRT process were critical 
from an operational perspective by ensuring that post-repair damage locations could be 
identified and repairs were not scheduled twice (Sampedro & Hughes, 2018). From a 
research perspective the comprehensiveness and accessibility of earthquake damage data, 
as well as level of service data, enables a detailed mechanistic understanding of the 
earthquake impacts on urban lifeline infrastructure (Sampedro & Hughes, 2018b). The 
combination of these detailed performance data with comprehensive spatial databases of 
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the waste water system enable detailed spatial analysis, linking system performance with 
seismic parameters and ground deformation data. 
The waste water pipe materials used in Christchurch are common to cities across New 
Zealand and around the world, and the standards used share similarities with other 
international pipework design and testing standards. Therefore, this case study on 
Christchurch will provide insight into the potential seismic performance of reinforced waste 
water pipes in other cities nationally and overseas, and the inputs required in the proposed 
method are easily retrievable in cities with developed information gathering systems and 
databases in place. 
1.4 Objectives 
The scope of this thesis is to develop an easily adaptable assessment method for assessing 
the robustness of gravity waste water pipes, which is a technical dimension of resilience in 
the waste water network.  
By identifying the effect of various parameters on pipe robustness to seismic damage, using 
the significant CES data available in Christchurch as a case study, this study contributes to an 
enhanced understanding of physical scale resilience of the network at the asset level.  
Ultimately this understanding assists decision making by territorial local authorities 
regarding the optimal allocation of resources following a disaster, thereby also improving 
the resilience of the waste water network on an organisational dimension.  
The key objectives of this method are to: 
a) Assess the extent of damage experienced by reinforced concrete gravity waste water 
pipes through the CES by examining CCTV recordings before and after the events;  
b) Determine correspondence between earthquake ground performance and concrete 
waste water pipe failure incidence/modes; 
c) Determine correspondence between intrinsic characteristics of concrete waste 
water pipes such as diameter and age of installation with failure incidence/modes. 
The following chapter presents a literature review of key aspects of Christchurch’s waste 
water infrastructure system development, and impacts of the CES, relevant to this study. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
Chapter 1 introduced the UNISDR risk components of hazard, exposure and vulnerability. In 
this study the hazard is defined as the CES, the exposure is the reinforced concrete waste 
water pipe network in Christchurch, and the vulnerabilities are the various parameters 
which are hypothesised to affect the network performance through the CES. This chapter 
provides a literature review of these risk components, tying these concepts into the context 
of reinforced concrete waste water pipe performance through the CES. 
Section 2.1 provides a technical background to the development of the design standards 
and innovations which have shaped and specified the “exposure” under consideration in 
this study. The history and expansion of the “exposure” is explored with a local focus in 
Section 2.2. 
Section 2.3  explores various pipe and network parameters in detail to examine their 
influence on earthquake performance, which together make up the “vulnerability” under 
consideration. 
Section 2.4 describes the CES or “hazard” and its geotechnical, structural and financial 
impacts, while Section 2.5 discusses the processes and techniques of assessing said impacts. 
2.1 History and design of reinforced concrete waste water pipes 
This section outlines the technological and legislative aspects which have affected the 
development of the reinforced concrete pipe in New Zealand, of which our definition of the 
risk component of “exposure” is a subset.  
2.1.1 Development of reinforced concrete pipe design 
Documented evidence of rigid sewer pipe materials such as reinforced concrete existed 
since the 19th century in North America. The modern design for reinforced concrete pipes 
has been developed over the past century through a series of innovations and milestones. A 
visual timeline was produced by Erdogmus and Tadros (2006) and presented in Figure 2-1: 




Figure 2-1. Visual timeline of reinforced concrete pipe development (Erdogmus & Tadros, 
2006) 
 
The first rational design approach of the buried concrete pipe, known as the ‘indirect design 
method’ was proposed by Anson Marston of Iowa State University in 1913 in the paper “The 
Theory of Loads on Pipes in Ditches and Tests of Cement and Clay Drain Tile and Sewer Pipe” 
(Marston & Anderson, 1913). The formula is known as the Marston load equation. 
Additional research in the 1920s was undertaken at Iowa State University which resulted in 
the publication of a comprehensive paper by Spangler in 1933. The paper introduced three 
standard bedding configurations (B, C, and D) to describe the surrounding soil pressure. 
Spangler also defined a fourth bedding configuration (A) where the bottom of the pipe sits 
in a concrete cradle or arch, however he stated that no attempt was made “either to 
measure or to estimate the distribution of the vertical reaction on the pipe when cradled in 
concrete” (Spangler, 1960). The historical bedding configurations are shown in Appendix C 
Figure C-1.  
The work by Marston and Spangler (1933) formed the basis of the ‘indirect method’ of pipe 
design where the loading is defined by the magnitude and distribution of earth pressure on 
the pipe, while the capacity is a function of a ‘bedding factor’, factor of safety, and test load 
from the three-edge bearing test (Spangler, 1960). The three-edge bearing test continues to 
be widely used today (Carleton et al., 2017). 
The indirect method was gradually refined to more accurately reflect installed conditions, 
but these modifications were not universally adopted by consulting engineers (Erdogmus & 
1933: Spangler developed 3 bedding 
configurations and the bedding factor 
1930: Marston developed 
earth loads on buried 
pipe 
1970-1980: American Concrete Pipe 
Association develops the ‘Direct 
Method’ 
2005: Additional research by 
the Nebraska Department of 
Roads 
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Tadros, 2006). The indirect method also consisted of many limitations such as considering 
the load to act only at the top of pipe, neglecting axial thrust and lacking clear definitions for 
bedding material and compaction levels (Al-Saleem & Langdon, 2015). 
In the 1960s, innovations in rubber joint gaskets resulted in significantly reduced pipe 
leakage and infiltration. Heger also proposed the use of welded deformed wire fabric to 
enhance crack control and bonding (Heger, 1963). 
In the 1970s-1980s, Finite Element Modelling (FEM) of concrete pipes began to increase in 
popularity due to technological advances of the time. The American Concrete Pipe 
Association (ACPA) commenced a research program which resulted in the computer 
software SPIDA (Soil-Pipe Interaction Design and Analysis). This resulted in the development 
of the ‘direct method’ which uses standardised earth pressure distributions developed by 
Heger (1963) for pipes depending on four standard methods of installation rather than the 
bedding configurations used in the past. This resulted in better representations of actual 
buried conditions and considers both strength and serviceability (Al-Saleem & Langdon, 
2015). The installation types are outlined in Appendix C, Table C-1. 
The ‘direct method’ was first incorporated in a 1993 American Society of Civil Engineers 
(ASCE) standard titled “ASCE Standard Practice for Direct Design of Buried Precast Concrete 
Pipe in Standard Installation” (SIDD). 
A general comparison of the direct and indirect methods was produced by Erdogmus and 
Tadros (2006), and is provided in Table 2-1. Major differences exist in the determination of 
the pipe supporting strength; however, the load calculations and installation types are 
consistent with each other. 
Both the direct and indirect methods continue to be widely used, however there is a need to 
update them to reflect modern material advances in concrete and steel reinforcing  
(Erdogmus et al., 2010). In recent years, fibre reinforced concrete pipes began to be 
deployed worldwide (Wong & Nehdi, 2018) slowly replacing steel reinforcing as an 
alternative material, however this has not been standardised in design codes. 
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Table 2-1. A simplified comparison of the direct and indirect methods for the design of buried 
reinforced concrete pipes (Erdogmus & Tadros, 2006)  
Indirect Design Direct Design 
1. Determine earth load (Prism Load x Arching Factor) 
2. Determine live load demand from AASHTO (American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials) 
3. Select Standard Installation Type  
4. Determine Bedding Factor 4. Determine Moments, Thrusts and Shear 
Forces 
5. Determine supporting strength from three-
edge bearing test 
6. Determine wall thickness, concrete strength 
and reinforced based on a limit state analysis 
6. Determine wall thickness, concrete strength 
and reinforced based on required supporting 
strength in step (5) 
2.1.2 Reinforced concrete pipe standards in New Zealand 
Table 2-2 shows the standards used in New Zealand which are applicable to buried concrete 
pipes. There are now two sets of standards specifying the buried pipe and the concrete pipe, 
respectively, which used to be part of the same standard until the 1970s. 
Table 2-2. Timeline of reinforced concrete pipe design standards in New Zealand 
Year of 
Publication 
Buried Pipe Standards Concrete Pipe Standards 
1937 Australian Standard A35, Precast Concrete Drainage Pipes 
1957 Australian Standard A35, Precast Concrete Drainage Pipes 
1974 NZS 4451:1974 Loads on buried rigid 
pipes 
  
1978  NZS 3107:1978 Specification for precast 
concrete drainage and pressure pipes 
1989 AS/NZS 3725:1989 Loads on buried 
concrete pipes 
  
1992  AS/NZS 4058:1992 Precast concrete 
pipes (pressure and non-pressure) 
2007 AS/NZS 3725:2007 Design for 
installation of buried concrete pipes 
AS/NZS 4058:2007 Precast concrete 
pipes (pressure and non-pressure) 
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Concrete pipes were first specified in the 1937 edition of Australian Standard A35, Precast 
Concrete Drainage Pipes. This standard specified one strength class known as Class X. A 
revision to the standard was undertaken in 1957 in response to a request from the 
Conference of State Road Authorities of Australia for the provision of two additional 
strength categories Class Y and Z, which have 50% and 100% higher cracking strengths than 
Class X respectively. Little else was changed in the standard by way of technical 
requirements of the specifications, other than a change to the method for determining 
water absorption, after investigations found that the previous method produced results 
which were not sufficiently accurate or reproducible (Standards Association of Australia, 
1957).  
In 1974 a separate standard for buried pipes was developed in the form of NZS 4451:1974, 
while in 1978 the concrete pipe standard NZS 3107:1978 was developed, making reference 
to NZS 4451:1974 where necessary for designing buried pipes. The standards then 
developed separately while being compatible with each other. 
Spangler’s (1933) bedding configurations (refer Appendix C Figure C-1) were included in the 
Australian design standard A35:1937 in the Appendix, and subsequently in the body of NZS 
4451:1974. These were widely used until the 1990s and were based on the ‘indirect 
method’. The findings from SPIDA and the development of the ‘direct method’ were 
incorporated into AS/NZS 3725:1989 (Al-Saleem & Langdon, 2015). In the development of 
the current New Zealand design standard for installation of buried concrete pipes (AS/NZS 
3725:2007), the joint technical committee WS-006 combined concepts from both the ‘direct 
method’ and ‘indirect method’ to develop its own support condition definitions (Al-Saleem 
& Langdon, 2015).  
A review of AS/NZS 3725:2007 by Al-Saleem and Langdon (2015) indicated that the standard 
needed additional development to suit New Zealand conditions. For example, selected 
bedding materials referred to in the standard are not readily available in most areas around 
the country. 
AS/NZS 4058:2007 specifies the reinforced concrete pipe itself. The following items are 
tested as a part of the standard (Standards New Zealand, 2007b): 
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 proof load / ultimate load testing 
 water tightness (also known as hydrostatic testing) 
 specified and ultimate pressure tests 
 water absorption 
 flexible joint assembly 
 measurement of concrete cover to reinforcement 
 measurement of dimensions other than concrete cover 
The load testing arrangement in Australia and New Zealand is based on a two-edge bearing 
test, which shares resemblances to the standard three-edge bearing test used in the United 
States, and the alternate three-edge bearing test adopted in the United Kingdom. 
 
Figure 2-2. Illustrations of pipe testing in New Zealand and overseas (Wong & Nehdi, 2018) 
 
A pipe specimen is loaded at a rate exceeding 10kN/min/m until the design crack size is 
achieved at 6 different points along the pipe based on the concrete cover provided. The 
crack size is measured while loaded, then the load is subsequently removed and the crack 
size is measured again. The crack sizes are not to exceed the sizes presented in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3. Design crack sizes with concrete cover as per AS/NZS 4058:2007 (Standards New 
Zealand, 2007b) 
Concrete Cover Pipe Loaded Load Removed 
≤10 mm 0.15 mm 0.10 mm 
Between 10 mm and 
20 mm 
0.20 mm 0.15 mm 
≥20 mm 0.25 mm 0.20 mm 




The ultimate load test was first specified in AS A35-1937 as a force application of 1.5 times 
the proof load test (Standards New Zealand, 2007b), which means that the pipe has a design 
factor of safety of 1.5. This was reduced to 1.25 in AS/NZS 4058:1992 due to the advent of 
higher material classes and was consistent with international standards of high load classes, 
and is currently the factor of safety in the current New Zealand precast concrete pipe design 
code. 
The water tightness test was first introduced in the Australian standard A35:1937 where the 
pipe is expected to be watertight to depths of up to 30 feet (approximately 9.1 m). This was 
adjusted to 100 kPa (approximately 10 m) in the subsequent New Zealand standard NZS 
3107:1978 and reduced to 90 kPa (approximately 9 m) in the later standard AS/NZS 
4058:1992, which is still applicable in the current standard AS/NZS 4058:2007. 
The current water absorption test outlined in AS/NZS 4058:2007 is undertaken on a 
concrete core sample retrieved from a pipe and measures the increase in weight once the 
specimen has been oven dried and exposed to water. The absorption is limited to 6% which 
is slightly more stringent than the preceding standards, where it was 6.5%.   
AS/NZS 4058:2007 poses restrictions on maximum acid-soluble chloride ion content of 0.8 
kg/m3 and sulphate ion content of 4-5% in the concrete mix depending on curing method 
used. Chemical admixtures are also prohibited from containing “nitrates, significant 
chlorides or other strongly ionized salts” due to durability concerns (Standards New Zealand, 
2007a). 
2.1.3 Comparison with international reinforced concrete pipe standards 
In a study of six countries together encompassing a quarter of the world’s population by 
Wong and Nehdi (2018), the reinforced concrete pipe standards were compared. The 
selected countries and the name of the standards are presented in Table 2.4.  
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Table 2-4. Comparison of international reinforced concrete pipe standards (Wong & Nehdi, 
2018) where RCP refers to Reinforced Concrete Pipe, FRCP refers to Fibre Reinforced 
Concrete Pipe, SFRCP refers to Steel Fibre Reinforced Concrete Pipe and SynFRCP refers to 
Synthetic Fibre Reinforced Concrete Pipe. 












Canada CSA 56, OCPA 
Concrete 
Design Manual 
CSA A257.2 (RCP) CSA A257.0 CSA A257.0 
USA ASCE15, ACPA 
Concrete Pipe 
Design Manual 
ASTM C76 (RCP), 
ASTM C1765 (SFRCP), 
ASTM C1818 
(SynFRCP) 




BS EN 1295 BS EN 1916 (RCP, 
FRCP) 
BS EN 1916 BS EN 1916 
Australia and 
New Zealand 
AS/NZS 3725 AS/NZS 4058 (RCP), 
AS4139 (FRCP) 
AS/NZS 4058 AS/NZS 4058 
China CECS 143 GB/T11836 (RCP) GB/T16752 GB/T16752 
 
The comparison of standards did not reveal that any design standard from a particular 
geographic region was more stringent or complex than others, with each standard having 
more stringent requirements in some areas and more lenient requirements in others. 
Australia and New Zealand allowed the greatest diversity in reinforced concrete pipe 
diameter (from 100 mm to 4200 mm) compared to other regions. Australian and New 
Zealand pipes also possessed more lenient design tolerances on pipe wall thickness 
compared to other countries, but tighter tolerances on pipe length for most diameter 
classes and concrete cover requirements, which were mainly determined by logistical 
constraints imposed by local transport authorities (Wong & Nehdi, 2018). In terms of 
hydrostatic performance and crack examination following a loading test, the New Zealand 
design code was found to be not as stringent as Canada and China. 
Similar to other international pipe design standards, design of buried reinforced concrete 
pipework in New Zealand has undergone multiple revisions since the first adoption of the 
Australian Standard A35, Precast Concrete Drainage Pipes in 1937. These were mainly in line 
with international innovations in pipe design. Wong and Nehdi (2018) stated in their 
international pipe standard comparison that currently Australia and New Zealand are “part 
of the front end of pipe technology advancement.”, however most modern reinforced 
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concrete pipe standards including AS/NZS 3725:2007 were not being reviewed frequently 
enough in comparison to state-of-the-art developments in other sectors such as the flexible 
pipe industry. 
2.2 History of the Christchurch waste water system 
This section presents the history and expansion of the waste water network in metropolitan 
Christchurch, which documents the waste water pipe “exposure” of interest in this research.  
Prior to the existence of the Christchurch Drainage Board in 1875, drainage issues in the city 
were addressed by the Canterbury Provincial Government (1853-1876), the Christchurch 
City Council, which was established in 1862 but only governed the area within the original 
town belts, and the Roads Boards, which from 1864 undertook drainage work lying beyond 
the town belts (Wilson, 1989). The city at the time lacked a proper sewerage system, and 
sewage disposal was by way of backyard long drops, cesspits, chamber pots, and routine 
nocturnal services of the ‘night men’, who were council contractors responsible for visiting 
properties under the cover of dark where people put their excrement (night soil) in buckets 
and dump it via horse drawn carriages to ‘manure depots’ in the city outskirts (Wilson, 
1989). Sewage was not always buried and lead to increased pollution of waterways and 
“water borne diseases such as typhoid, diphtheria and dysentery in the city” (Wilson, 1989). 
To address the problem, the Christchurch Drainage Board was formed in 1875. It was the 
first body of its type in New Zealand with the sole responsibility to manage stormwater 
drainage and sewerage disposal, in contrast to other main centres where these were 
managed by the local territorial authority (Wilson, 1989). 
The original plan for the Christchurch sewerage system was proposed in 1877 by John 
Carruthers, who was the chief engineer of the Board. His idea was based on a combined 
storm water and waste water system which was conveyed east to an estuary outfall. His 
idea was met with criticism due to “fears of sewage contamination at the estuary outfall, 
blockages, and inadequacies in the local water supply for flushing” (Wilson, 1989).  
 




Figure 2-3. View of ground excavation work in 1918 (Wilson, 1989) 
In 1878 the Board hired a new consulting engineer William Clark, who revised the original 
plans to separate the waste water from the storm water. The plan included the construction 
of a pumping station to pump the sewage to the east of the city to a sewage farm which 
could use it to irrigate paddocks as fertiliser. Clark’s scheme was approved, but construction 
was slow. This is due to the fact that the flat, low-lying nature of the city made it difficult to 
achieve sufficient fall in gravity pipes, and the swamp-like ground conditions, often riddled 
with tree stumps as shown in Figure 2-3, were unsatisfactory for pipe foundations (Wilson, 
1989). 
In 1882 the initial design was finished, but not all properties were immediately connected as 
landowners needed to pay a connection fee. In 1884, Christchurch had 293 water closets 
(individual toilets), which increased to 1915 in 1901. Most of the original pipes were 
constructed of earthenware (EW) and the smaller diameter pipes were made locally, 
whereas the larger ones were imported from Scotland (Wilson, 1989). 
The network was continually expanded over the past century and a visual timeline of the 
sewered areas by date of construction is shown in Figure 2-4. The inner suburbs tend to 
have older installation dates, with the majority of pipes within 2 km of the Central Business 
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District being constructed between 1890 and 1930. Older pipes installed prior to the 
implementation AS/NZS 3725:1989 were based on the ‘indirect’ design methodology in 
comparison to the subsequent standards which combined concepts from the ‘direct’ design 
methodology. Refer section 2.1.2 for a comparison of the New Zealand reinforced concrete 
pipe design and testing standards. 
By 1989, when the responsibilities of the Board passed onto the newly enlarged 
Christchurch City Council, Christchurch had transformed from New Zealand’s unhealthiest 
town to the country’s best drained city (Wilson, 1989).  Following the CES, many of the city’s 
original 19th century sewer lines were replaced or decommissioned. Pipes that experienced 
minor damage were re-lined and continue to be used to this day. 
 
Figure 2-4. Sewered areas showing stages of construction from 1880 to 1989 (Wilson, 1989) 
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Figure 2-5 provides a graphical indication of the decades of installation for individual waste 
water pipes across Christchurch City and Lyttleton Harbour for all material types. The 
installation dates of the pipes appear to be consistent within a suburb in accordance to 
Figure 2-4. 
 
Figure 2-5. Christchurch City and Lyttleton Harbour waste water network graphed according 
to the decade of installation (Cubrinovski et al., 2014) 
The current waste water network consists of a city-wide network of approximately 1800 km 
of pipe leading to the treatment plant located in Bromley. The pipes have an asset design 
life of 100 years (Cubrinovski et al., 2011). The wastewater pipes are typically laid in the 
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centre of roads with a 1.2 m minimum vertical cover, the majority of pipes are gravity pipes 
which are 2.0-3.5 m deep and laid between manholes which are spaced at maximum 
distances of 100 m for small diameter pipes, and up to 180 m for trunk mains (Cubrinovski 
et al., 2011).  The few that pipes are pressurised are generally located within a depth of 1 m 
similar to the potable water network. The distribution of gravity and pressurised pipes in the 
city is shown in Figure 2-6. 
 
Figure 2-6. Christchurch City and Lyttleton Harbour waste water network graphed to 
distinguish between gravity and pressurized pipelines (Cubrinovski et al., 2014) 
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The proportion of gravity waste water pipes of each diameter class in Christchurch city was 
provided by Heiler et al. (2012), refer to Table 2-5 below. The majority of waste water pipes 
in the city have a diameter between 150-199 mm for all material categories. 
Table 2-5. Gravity waste water pipes in Christchurch by diameter (Heiler et al., 2012). 






>400 mm Total 
Length 32 km 1020 km 353 km 89km 116 km 1610 km 
% of Total 2% 63% 22% 6% 7% 100% 
 
2.3 Factors affecting reinforced concrete waste water pipe 
performance 
This section explores the factors which are hypothesised to affect the susceptibility and 
performance of reinforced concrete waste water pipes to earthquakes, which is our 
definition of the risk component of “vulnerability” in this study. 
2.3.1 Chemical and biological deterioration 
Extensive literature exists regarding the chemical and biological deterioration of reinforced 
concrete waste water pipes. Pipes with significant existing deterioration will have higher 
susceptibility to earthquake damage due to their weakened structure. 
Biogenic sulphuric acid deterioration is considered to be the most damaging attack 
mechanism for the entire concrete waste water network, including pipelines, aeration tanks, 
septic tanks, pumping stations and influence channels (Parande et al., 2006). Chemically, the 
gravity waste water environment is characterised by high sulphate and dissolved sulphide 
concentrations, high hydrogen sulphide gas content, low dissolved oxygen levels and low 
acidity level (O’Connell et al., 2010).  The higher these chemical contents the greater the 
biogenic deterioration. 
In sewage effluent, sulphate-reducing proteolytic bacteria Acidithiobacillus thiooxidans 
convert sulphates to sulphides under anaerobic conditions which diffuse into the air. Lower 
water flows (velocities and quantity) were found to result in increased conversion activity, 
for example a study by Romanova et al. (2014) showed that between late evening to early 
morning effluent flow is typically lower due to reduced household and industrial activity, 
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and hydrogen sulphide gas concentration in manholes was higher. During this time the 
temperatures were also lower, which the authors attributed to less hot water discharge and 
lower surrounding ambient temperature. 
The sulphides are subsequently further reduced by oxygen, where present, to sulphur and 
sulphur compounds (Neville, 2004). The bacteria genus Thiobacillus converts these to 
sulphuric acid. A visual representation of this is provided by De Schutter (2012) and featured 
in Figure 2-7, showing that this occurs in both the air and effluent liquid environment: 
 
Figure 2-7. Sulphuric acid attack mechanism, retrieved from Damage to Concrete Structures 
by De Schutter (2012) 
The acid directly attacks the cement matrix by reacting with calcium hydroxide in cement to 
yield calcium sulphate in accordance to the following equation: 
𝐶𝑎(𝑂𝐻)2 +𝐻2𝑆𝑂4 → 𝐶𝑎𝑆𝑂4 + 2𝐻2𝑂                 (1) 
The calcium sulphate appears on the surface of the pipe walls as a substance with a slime 
and cheese-like texture. This reacts to form gypsum around pH levels less than 3 (Mori et al., 
1992). The formation of gypsum results in the loss of cohesive strength in the cement and 
may further also react with calcium aluminium hydrate in the cement to form Ettringite at 
pH levels greater than3 (Mori et al., 1992). Ettringite is considered to be a significant cause 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
28 
 
of the expansion and hence disruption to concrete structures; it has an expansive formation 
that etches concrete surfaces, and penetrates the mortar surface causing cracking and 
pitting (Saricimen et al., 2003).  
The worst damage typically occurs slightly above the sewage level, where the concrete pipe 
walls are vulnerable to deterioration from both vapor and liquid phases of sewage and can 
experience corrosion of up to 4.3-4.7 mm per year. In comparison, the deterioration at the 
crown of the pipe experiences the least damage, typically 1.4 mm per year (Mori et al., 
1992). 
Several methods such as high-performance coatings, linings consisting of fibreglass, brick,  
ceramic and specialised mortars exist to protect concrete from sulphuric acid damage 
produced by Thiobacillus. 
Carbonation and chloride attack are two alternative damage mechanisms affecting 
reinforced concrete waste water pipes, which together result in corrosion of reinforcing 
bars. Steel passivates due the high alkalinity of the cement where the pH is typically above 
13. Carbonation occurs when carbonic acid is formed from the reaction of calcium 
hydroxide in the cement with dissolved carbon dioxide in the pipe environment. The process 
reduces the alkalinity of concrete, and when the pH is reduced below 8.3, the passive layer 
becomes ineffective and the corrosion of the steel can occur (Broomfield, 2007). 
Carbonation causes slow deterioration over many years and is dependent on waste water 
flow, solubility of carbon dioxide (CO2), pH and water hardness in the pipes. 
Chloride attack is a third attack mechanism whereby chloride ions penetrate through the 
concrete cover and destabilise the passive layer around the steel, resulting in corrosion of 
the reinforcing bars. The formation of the corrosion product is an expansive process, as the 
volume of the corrosion products increase up to a factor of six in the concrete which 
exceeds its tensile capacity, resulting in spalling and cracking (Broomfield, 2007). Acidophilic 
bacteria also oxidise ferrous to ferric oxide leading to the rapid  acceleration of corrosion of 
steel reinforcement (Parande et al., 2006). 
In industrial waste water, acid deterioration results from manufactured acids reacting with 
the alkaline cementitious compounds. The extent is dependent on the sewage flow rate and 
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solubility of chlorides. pH levels below 12.5 result in the depletion of potassium and sodium, 
followed by the depletion of hydroxides and calcium silicate hydrate (C-S-H) at pH levels 
below 10 and 8, respectively (Parande et al., 2006). Industrial processes also result in 
increased chloride content in the waste water. 
The durability of a buried reinforced concrete pipe is also affected by the continual exposure 
of the outer pipe to soil constituents such as sulphate, chloride salts, and dissolved CO2. 
Sulphates exist in the natural soil in the form of calcium, sodium, magnesium and potassium, 
while ammonium sulphate also exists in industrial and agricultural soil due to the production 
and use of fertilisers (Parande et al., 2006). 
AS/NZS 4058:2007 Appendix E provides limits of 20,000 ppm and 1,000 ppm to the 
allowable soil concentration of chlorides and sulphates, respectively, for general-purpose 
reinforced concrete. The pH of the soil needs to be controlled within 4.5-5.5 depending on 
its drainage characteristics, with permeable soil types such as clean gravel and sands having 
more stringent requirements in comparison to impervious types such as homogeneous clays 
(Standards New Zealand, 2007a). 
The maintenance costs associated with addressing the impacts of chemical and biological 
deterioration of wastewater pipes are very high around the world, having exceeded $25 
billion per year in the United States alone (O’Connell et al., 2010). Test results by Moradian 
et al. (2012) revealed most damage in poorly constructed networks is a complex 
combination of all the aforementioned damage mechanisms of biogenic sulphuric acid 
attack, chloride attack, and carbonation. Moradian et al. (2012) stated that most authors 
focused on the biogenic sulphuric acid attack as the main mechanism, and overlooked the 
other aforementioned aggressive phenomena, which should be addressed for a 
comprehensive deterioration review. 
2.3.2 Fabrication 
Reinforced concrete pipes are fabricated using three main processes, which result in slightly 
different characteristics. The spun process uses centrifugal spinning to reduce the water to 
cement ratio. The process is currently used for the widest range of diameters (between 150 
mm-2300 mm). The roller suspension process uses centrifugal roller compaction and heavy 
vibration and is primarily used for reinforced concrete pipes between 225 mm-600 mm in 
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diameter, however these pipes are not suitable for marine environment applications, 
indicating their higher susceptibility to corrosion. The Vibration Technology (VT) process is a 
vertical dry cast process which results from a dry mix concrete being placed in a mould and 
the inner core is vibrated. The pipe is subsequently removed from the core and transported 
by crane directly to the curing area where the outer mould is stripped. It is used primarily 
for larger pipes between 675-2400 mm in diameter (Concrete Pipe Association of 
Australasia, 2018).  
The centrifugal and roller suspension processes have existed since the early 1900s, while the 
VT process was a much later innovation around 2002 following the British and European 
standards BSEN 1916:2002 and BS 5911-1:2002, which result in thicker walls providing 
increased cover for steel compared to the previous two methods (Concrete Pipe Association 
of Australasia, 2018).  
Water content and concrete mix during the fabrication of reinforced concrete pipes result in 
differences in reported durability performance in waste water systems. In New Zealand, 
these are regulated through NZS 3121:2015 Water and aggregate for concrete (Standards 
New Zealand, 2007a). The aforementioned three fabrication processes result in a low water 
to cement ratio (between 0.3 and 0.4), resulting in concrete compression strengths up to 60 
MPa. This ensures that the concrete is impermeable to water and achieves the highest 
levels of durability for any commercial concrete casting process in the New Zealand industry 
(Concrete Pipe Association of Australasia, 2018). 
Literature on concrete mix durability concluded that in sewer conditions with significant 
biological (microbial) activity, calcium aluminate cements experienced less sulphuric acid 
degradation compared to normal Portland cement, due to the ability of the former mix to 
affect the metabolism of the sulphate reducing proteolytic bacteria, resulting in less 
sulphuric acid production (Alexander & Fourie, 2011). Aggregate type has also been 
demonstrated to be effective in controlling sulphuric acid deterioration, where “limestone 
aggregates showed smaller degradation depths than inert aggregates due to the production 
of a local buffering environment to protect the underlying cement paste” (Beliea et al., 
2004). 
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The steel reinforcing used affects the tensile strength of concrete and hence crack control 
properties and water tightness. AS/NZS 4058 requires that all steel reinforcing complies with 
AS/NZS 4761 to ensure that the reinforcement component of the product is known and 
controlled (Standards New Zealand, 2007a). Reinforcing cages are typically sourced from 
steel suppliers with an accredited quality system meeting AS/NZS ISO 9001, with testing 
conducted by laboratories or inspection bodies that are accredited by International 
Accreditation New Zealand (IANZ). The steel reinforcement cages are typically fabricated 
using high-precision automated welding machines (Concrete Pipe Association of Australasia, 
2018). Reinforcing steel with high carbon content has been observed to be more susceptible 
to chloride attack than ductile iron (Song et al., 2017). 
The size and layout of reinforcing used is dependent on in-house design specifications of 
pipe manufacturers. This depends on the pipe application, size class, joint type, load class 
and water-tightness class. The reinforcing cage used may differ significantly among 
manufacturers and could range from singly to doubly reinforced or be circular or elliptical in 
shape. Four common configurations are depicted in Figure 2-8, which are all used in the 
waste water infrastructure systems in New Zealand. Doubly reinforced sections have higher 
tensile and therefore bending capacity than singly reinforced sections. 




Figure 2-8. Examples of various steel cage configurations for reinforced concrete pipes in 
New Zealand (Standards New Zealand, 2007a). 
In cases where the joint design includes a socket of some variety, some prescribed amount 
of socket reinforcement is also included. Due to the lengths of pipe fabricated, some cages 
may require lapping the cages to create a structural continuity between the barrel and 
socket reinforcement (Concrete Pipe Association of Australasia, 2018). Joints have been 
observed to have higher defect rates than general parts of the pipe.  A study by O'Reilly et al. 
(1989) showed that up to 23% of joints in a random investigation were defective, and 
concluded that “the elimination of connections and their substitution by junctions would 
remove a major source of structural defects in pipe sewers”. 
2.3.3 Installation 
The installation method and choice of bedding arrangement of a buried pipe after 
fabrication is considered to affect the amount of stress it is subjected to during daily service 
and seismic loads. The higher the percentage compaction of soil surrounding the pipe, the 
better the support is in the direction of imparted stress. 
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The buried pipe standard NZS3725:2007, which was introduced earlier in section 2.1.2, 
classifies installation conditions as either trench or embankment conditions, as per Figure 
2-9. In trench conditions the backfill settlement over time results in a load acting at the top 
of the pipe which is offset by frictional forces developing between the sides of the trench 
and the fill. The loads acting on the pipe depend on the trench dimensions, pipe diameter, 
compaction and the requirements for trench support. An embankment condition results 
from pipes being laid near ground level and fill being placed over the top of the pipe. The 
loading on the pipe in an embankment is primarily due to pipe diameter and height of the 
fill (Concrete Pipe Association of Australasia, 2018).  
In order to maintain the proper pipe alignment and sustain the weight of soil, traffic and 
construction loading over the length of a pipe, various zones surrounding the pipe are 
specified for both installation conditions. The Bed Zone lies beneath the pipe and is 
generally 100-150 mm thick, acting to provide even support and cushioning underneath the 
pipe. Above lies the Haunch Zone, the thickness being approximately 10-30% of the external 
pipe diameter. The role of the Haunch Zone is to reduce bending moment effects in the pipe 
walls and transfer the loads to the Bed Zone. The Side Zones above the Haunch Zone protect 
the sides of the pipe, and the overlay zone protects the top of the pipe from physical 
damage due to oversized aggregates and other objects in the backfill or embankment fill 
(Concrete Pipe Association of Australasia, 2018). The overall trench widths are 300 mm 
wider than the diameter of the pipe (Cubrinovski et al., 2011). 




Figure 2-9. Cross section of a buried pipe as specified in Australia and New Zealand 
(Standards New Zealand, 2007a). 
 
For the above two installation conditions, six support conditions (H1, H2, HS1, HS2, HS3, and 
U) are also defined, where H stands for Haunch Support, HS stands for Haunch and Side 
Support, and the following number represents the compaction of fill. These support 
conditions have incorporated a mix of both Spangler’s bedding configurations (refer 
Appendix C, Figure C-1), and the ACPA Type 1-3 standard installations (refer Appendix C, 
Table C-1). This means the standard combines theory from both the indirect method and 
the direct method, which are two different theoretical approaches of pipe soil interaction 
analysis, resulting in confusion for the engineer, asset manager or contractor.  
The standard has been viewed as overly conservative, laden with technical irregularities, 
and not achievable in many cases, such as target compaction percentage (Al-Saleem & 
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Langdon, 2015). Therefore implementation of NZS3725:2007 has been regarded as difficult 
and costly in most parts of New Zealand (Al-Saleem & Langdon, 2015), and as a result many 
territorial authorities have developed their own standard details which is loosely based on 
the NZS3725:2007, but has been simplified and adapted based on local conditions. This 
means the installation specifications of buried pipes across New Zealand are different 
depending on the area of jurisdiction. Table 2-6 compares the installation methods across 
some of the major cities in New Zealand and compared to the New Zealand Standards. 
In Christchurch, backfill for a waste water pipe was dependant on the age of construction. 
Older pipes tended to be backfilled with local native soils, while newer pipes were specified 
with either AP20 or AP40 backfills compacted to 95% dry density (Cubrinovski et al., 2014). 
These engineered backfills are required to meet a particular particle size distribution 
envelope in accordance to the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA), with the maximum 
aggregate size not exceeding 20 mm for AP20, and not exceeding 40 mm for AP40. AP40 
backfill has reportedly resulted in better earthquake performance for certain materials (e.g. 
High-Density Polyethylene (HDPE) and Asbestos Cement (AC)) compared to native soils, but 
offered no obvious benefits for other materials such as Galvanised Iron (GI) (Cubrinovski et 
al., 2014). 
Soils with better drainage such as gravels and sands were observed to result in lower defect 
rates to buried pipes than silts and clays (O'Reilly et al., 1989). Soil expansion also causes 
stresses on waste water pipes due to swelling in clay particles when water is absorbed and 
shrinkage when moisture is lost due to evaporation or transpiration (Davies et al., 2001). A 
similar effect exists for the freezing and thawing of soils, and was most pronounced in 
trench installations where the backfill and side-fill had different frost susceptibilities (Davies 
et al., 2001). 
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Table 2-6. Pipe installation specifications by NZS standards and major cities in New Zealand 
(Al-Saleem & Langdon, 2015) 
Standard Bedding 
Type 









Type A Concrete D/4 Not 
Specified 
  




Shape subgrade for 
earth foundation 
(no bedding) 
Type C Compacted soil free 




Type D N/A   Not Recommended 
NZS 
4404:2010 
Type 1 Concrete D/4 Not 
Specified 
  
Type 2 Granular Materials D/2 Not 
Specified 
  
Type 3 N/A   For flexible pipes 














H2 Free draining granular 




2.0 or 1.7 With reference to 
AS/NZS 3725:2007 
Nelson City H2 AP20 + Clegg Impact 
Value 35 for roads and 
25 for others 
D/3 2.0 or 1.7 Geotextile wrap 
where immigration 
of fines possible 
Wellington 
Region 
N/A 5-20 Drainage to D/4 + 








of fines possible 
Palmerston 
North 




Compaction 95% to 
top of trench. 
Others   Not 
Specified 
























O'Reilly et al. (1989) observed that the defect rate gradually reduced to an installed depth of 
5.5 m, and then increased again beyond this depth. They theorised that the depth between 
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0 – 5.5 m reflected a reduction in the loads from surface level traffic and utility maintenance 
activities. Beyond this depth, the increase in defect rate is associated with the increasing 
magnitude of overburden pressure. Other studies however indicate most defect rates apply 
to waste water pipes installed within the first 2 m, where the “effect of seasonal moisture 
variations in the soil may be significant” (Davies et al., 2001). Earthquake wave actions were 
observed to vary at different installation depths. For instance, pipes closer to the surface are 
typically subjected to Rayleigh waves, and pipes deeper to S waves (O’Rourke et al., 2014). 
If the pipes are pressurised, their seismic performance has been noted to increase 
compared to gravity pipes (Liu et al., 2015). This has been studied in international literature 
where fragility functions for potable water pressurised pipelines were adopted to study the 
physical damage to a gravity waste water network, and were found to slightly 
underestimate the damage observed (Liu et al., 2015). 
2.3.4 Service conditions 
The above-ground conditions have reportedly resulted in different defect levels in buried 
waste water pipes. The operation of construction vehicles was reported to increase 
observed defect levels to pipes underneath construction sites (Davies et al., 2001). Pipes 
beneath gardens and residential homes were identified as having more structural defects 
than pipes beneath roads, where it was suggested that this was due to excessive 
disturbances during house construction or garden maintenance (O'Reilly et al., 1989). The 
same study also identified that increases in traffic flow resulted in a marginal increase in 
overall defect rate for small to medium roads, with the exception of trunk roads where the 
pavement was theorised to be stronger with higher design requirements (O'Reilly et al., 
1989). 
2.3.5 Age 
The age of reinforced concrete pipes is considered to have an indirect effect on their 
durability by determining the design standard and specifications used in its design, and 
consequently the strength of materials specified in construction, installation method and 
backfill type. Refer to section 2.1.2 for a discussion of the reinforced concrete pipe design 
standard in New Zealand and its development over time. 
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Age also increases the length of time the pipes are affected by biogenic and corrosive 
processes over time (refer Section 2.3.1). Gradual processes such as carbonation are 
especially pronounced in older pipes. However, mixed results are reported in the literature 
for the relationship between defect rate and age. In a United Kingdom waste water network 
performance study, O'Reilly et al. (1989) estimated that the defect rate was 7.4% - 11.3% for 
pipes prior to 1944, which then dropped to 2% in the next 25 years and then even further to 
0.6%-1.2%, indicating a clear increase in defects with age of the pipe. However, an alternate 
study by Lester and Farrar (1979) could not find any correlation between defect rate and 
age. 
2.3.6 Dimensions 
The physical dimensions of reinforced concrete pipes affect durability by influencing how 
the forces are distributed, the steel reinforcing arrangement, bar sizes, and fabrication 
processes used in their construction (refer Section 2.3.2).  
The sizes of pipe sections are generally defined by their interior and exterior diameters. In 
general, larger-diameter pipes provide increased pipe wall thicknesses that allow for more 
space to accommodate reinforcement, resulting in higher flexural and shear strength (Wong 
& Nehdi, 2018). Thicker pipe walls also result in higher rigidity, which has been reported in 
different kinds of observed failure modes (Edkins et al., 2016). 
In the Christchurch context, the susceptibility of different pipe diameters for a specific pipe 
material type is difficult to establish due to the fact that “materials for different network 
components are usually restricted to only a few diameter classes” (Cubrinovski et al., 2014). 
However, pipes of different diameters have been observed to have different failure 
mechanisms despite being composed of the same material (Romero et al., 2010), which 
reinforces the hypothesis that the distribution of forces vary based on diameter classes. 
2.4 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
This section explores the background and impacts of the CES, which is the hazard under 
consideration in this study.  
In New Zealand, earthquakes represent one of the most significant risks due to the 
abundance of active seismic faults that lie beneath the country. New Zealand lies on the 
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tectonic boundary between the Indo-Australian and Pacific plates. The relative motions of 
the two plates are not concentrated on one or two fault lines in a narrow zone, but across a 
complex network of faults across a much larger zone (Quigley et al., 2016).  This means that 
earthquakes may potentially occur at multiple locations, making them difficult to predict. 
The Alpine Fault, Wellington Fault and Hikurangi Subduction Zones are believed to pose the 
greatest risk to the country as a whole. This is because the Alpine Fault traverses over 400 
km across the South Island, the Wellington Fault lies directly beneath the capital city and the 
Hikurangi Subduction Zone represents significant risk to the entire eastern North Island, in 
addition to being assessed as having a high probability to generate tsunamis. Major 
earthquake sequences on any of these faults could lead to damage to life and property on 
an unprecedented level (New Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017). A relatively recent example 
of the devastation caused by earthquakes occurred in Christchurch, which is the largest city 
in the South Island of New Zealand with a population of approximately 350,000 living in an 
area of 1426 km2 (Hughes et al., 2015). 
A sequence of earthquakes devastated the region starting in 2010 and these became known 
as the Canterbury Earthquake Sequences (CES). The major events occurred on 4 September 
2010 (Moment Magnitude (Mw) 7.1), 22 February 2011 (Mw 6.2), 13 June 2011 (two 
earthquakes with Mw 5.3 at 1:00 p.m. and Mw 6.0 at 2:20 p.m.), and 23 December 2011 (two 
earthquakes with Mw 5.8 at 1:58 p.m. and Mw 5.9 at 3:18 p.m.) (Hughes et al., 2015). 
Between September 2010 and mid-July 2012, the Canterbury region experienced three 
events between magnitudes 6.0 - 6.9, 54 events between magnitudes 5.0 - 5.9, 431 events 
between magnitudes 4.0 - 4.9, over 3000 events between magnitudes 3.0-3.9, and 
thousands of smaller tremors. The majority of the epicentres for the main events were 
located within 10 km of the Christchurch city centre (Quigley et al., 2016). 
2.4.1 Ground Deformation 
2.4.1.1 Transient ground deformation – Peak Ground Acceleration and Peak Ground Velocity 
Earthquake-induced ground motions exhibit spatial variability over short distances of 
several metres due to local heterogeneous soil conditions that can give different site 
responses. Over large distances the fault rupture mechanism and wave propagation through 
a heterogeneous crust also affects the site response (Bradley, 2014). 
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Seismic ground motions are typically reported as PGA or PGV distributions and provide an 
indication of the intensity of shaking at a given site in accordance to an accelerogram. PGA is 
usually expressed in terms of g (acceleration due to gravity) and PGV in cm s-1 (centimetres 
per second). Larger PGA and PGV values place greater demand on the pipe and increases 
the susceptibility to damage.  
Ground motion information is not generally provided as a deterministic number, but as a 
probability distribution with mean and standard deviation estimated from conventional 
ground motion theory. The PGA probability distribution is conditional on the actual 
measured PGA obtained from accelerometers throughout the city, so that the measured 
values provide some constraint (Bradley & Hughes, 2012). 
A current map of accelerometers and strong motion sensors throughout Christchurch is 
shown below in Figure 2-10. Strong motion sensors measure PGV and have higher sensitivity 
than accelerometers, which measure PGA but have greater range (Seismology Research 
Centre, 2014). 
 
Figure 2-10. Sensors around Christchurch as a part of GeoNet’s continuous GNSS network 
(GNS Science, 2018). 
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Figure 2-11 shows the conditional PGA calculated from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake. General findings concluded that PGA amplitudes displayed a general 
attenuation with increasing distance from the earthquake epicentre (Bradley & Hughes, 
2012). Inherent uncertainties in ground motion calculations should also be taken into 
account and any PGA retrieved at a considerable distance from existing ground motion 
stations is considered to have more uncertainty than those which are calculated nearby. 
For small to moderate earthquakes the PGA is a reasonably good determinant of the 
observed damage to buildings and infrastructure, while for larger earthquakes PGV becomes 
more accurate at predicting damage outcome (U.S Geological Survey, 2011). 
 
Figure 2-11. Conditional median PGA predicted from the February 2011 earthquake (Bradley 
& Hughes, 2012) 
2.4.1.2 Permanent ground deformation – liquefaction and lateral spreading 
Liquefaction is a phenomenon resulting from strong ground motions which causes 
substantial strength and stiffness loss in saturated, unconsolidated soils. During the CES it 
was demonstrated that liquefaction had been particularly damaging to underground brittle 
assets such as reinforced concrete pipes due to the associated lateral spreading and 
differential subsidence (New Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017).  
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The minimum PGA required to yield liquefaction manifestations and corresponding 
subsidence is 0.1-0.2 g and in Christchurch this has an estimated return period of between 
40-170 years (Stirling, et al., 2008). However, in susceptible soils with high water table this 
could be as low as 0.08 g (Hughes et al., 2015). 
Liquefaction and ground damage varied by suburb during the earthquake sequences; this is 
due to spatial variability of the shallow subsoil classification in different areas of the city 
(Cubrinovski et al., 2011). Some soil types are more susceptible to earthquake-induced 
ground motions than others. One way this can be quantified is through the use of a 
Liquefaction Resistance Index (LRI) developed by (Cubrinovski et al., 2011). The LRI is based 
on a factor of safety against triggering liquefaction, multiplied by a cyclic stress ratio. The 
factor of safety is assigned based on observed liquefaction and estimated ground settlement 
in liquefied areas in accordance to Table 2-7. In areas with no visible liquefaction, the water 
table depth was used to estimate the factor. The cyclic stress ratio is calculated from PGA 
recorded using strong motion sensors across the city and interpolated. 
Table 2-7. Factor of safety against liquefaction (Cubrinovski et al., 2011) 
 
The LRI value were sorted into five different zones where the susceptibility is directly 
proportional between different zones. The higher the LRI value, the less the liquefaction 
susceptibility. 
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Figure 2-12 shows the LRI zones in Christchurch city with the locations of repaired waste 
water pipe midpoints superimposed. The worst affected liquefaction areas appear to be 
within close proximity to the Avon River, and affecting “alluvial and marine fine sediments in 
the eastern suburbs, in the region of late Holocene coastal progradation” (Hughes et al., 
2015). 
 
Figure 2-12. Locations of repaired waste water pipe midpoints within the LRI analysis area, 
and LRI zones (Cubrinovski et al., 2014)  
Figure 2-13 below shows the summary repair data for the four most widespread materials 
(Concrete, Earthenware, Asbestos Cement and Plasticised Polyvinyl Chloride) within the LRI 
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zones. For the waste water network in Christchurch city, we can visually discern that the 
higher the LRI (less susceptible to liquefaction), the fewer repairs were generally required, 
and nearly 80% of the damaged water mains were in liquefied areas (Cubrinovski et al., 
2014). 
Observed damage type has also been reported to differ between pipes subjected to varying 
levels of liquefaction. For example, previous studies regarding the potable water network 
showed that in high liquefaction zones, liquefaction-based failures were more evident as 
breaks in the pipes and its fittings resulted from differential soil pressure. In non-
liquefaction areas, ground shaking and Fluid Structure Interaction (FSI) effects were 
dominant, resulting in breakages and leaks due to excessive pressure surges (Rais et al., 
2015). 
 
Figure 2-13. Summary repair data for the four most spatially extensive waste water pipe 
materials (Concrete, Earthenware, Asbestos Cement and Unplasticised Polyvinyl Chloride) 
within Liquefaction Resistance Index Zones. Data cover the period 5 September 2010 to 5 
June 2013 (Cubrinovski et al., 2014) 
2.4.2 Subsidence and lateral spreading 
Ground surface subsidence and lateral spreading were the primary shallow ground 
movements during the CES. Ground tectonic uplifts were recorded up to 400 mm near the 
Avon/Heathcote estuary and the central and northern suburbs experienced tectonic 
subsidence up to 150 mm. Overall, however, widespread subsidence was caused 
predominantly by liquefaction-induced settlement. Permanent lateral ground displacements 
were recorded in the order of 2.0 – 3.0 m along the Avon and Kaiapoi River, but were 
usually constrained to narrow corridors near bodies of water (Cubrinovski et al., 2011). 
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LiDAR surveys were used to measure the extent of ground movement before and after each 
main CES event. Millions of position data points were collected from sweeping lasers 
mounted on aircraft as a LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) survey point cloud. The data 
points may be categorised as ground or non-ground, e.g. for survey points reflecting off 
vegetation and other structures. The ground data points were averaged and reported as a 
single value within a square cell (usually 5m × 5m) and used to generate a suite of Digital 
Elevation Models (DEMs) due to the large quantity of data available (Canterbury 
Geotechnical Database, 2014) (Canterbury Geotechnical Database, 2014). The DEMs can be 
compared to a baseline DEM taken between 2003-2008 to identify overall changes to 
ground movement, and compared before and after each event to indicate the change in 
ground level during each event. Most LiDAR surveys were taken one month after each event 
to allow time for the removal of liquefaction ejecta (Canterbury Geotechnical Database, 
2014). 
LiDAR surveys have limitations on accuracy, including measurement errors, error due to 
interpolation in areas with a low density of ground data points, and limitations due to 
capture resolution known as granularity. These are depicted graphically in Figure 2-14 below: 
 
Figure 2-14. Cross section showing DEM accuracy errors of an area with vegetation and 
buildings (Canterbury Geotechnical Database, 2014) 
The horizontal accuracy is ± 0.55 m and the vertical accuracy is ± 0.15 m for the 2003 
baseline survey, and ± 0.07 m for the CES surveys. The accuracy limitations are due to the 
data collection process, where some ground data is scanned twice or more on repeat 
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flyovers, and due to dynamic corrections, which were applied to account for aircraft 
movement such as side-to-side rolling (Canterbury Geotechnical Database, 2014). Additional 
sources of error include Global Positioning Survey (GPS) errors and approximations within 
the New Zealand Quasigeoid reference surface. The point clouds were verified by comparing 
them to surveyed benchmarks, which themselves have a vertical accuracy of ± 0.03 m 
(Canterbury Geotechnical Database, 2014). 
The overall accuracy is calculated as cumulative frequency distributions by the Canterbury 
Geotechnical Database (2014) and provided below in Figure 2-15. The median error is 
mostly similar for the different DEM sets collected throughout the various events and the 
2003 data set had the largest standard deviation due to older equipment being used, which 
had greater accuracy limitations. 
 
Figure 2-15. Cross section showing DEM accuracy errors of an area with vegetation and 
buildings (Canterbury Geotechnical Database, 2014). 
Angular distortion was often used as an indication of the deformation of the ground 
between two points. It is a dimensionless parameter obtained from the differential vertical 
movement between two adjacent LiDAR measurements divided by the distance between 
them (O’Rourke et al., 2014). The parameter is widely used together with horizontal soil 
strain to estimate the effects of subsidence and lateral spreading on foundations, and a 
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reference chart was developed by (Boscardin & Cording, 1989) from field observations and 
analytical models to relate these parameters with damage severity. 
2.4.3 Impacts on the built environment and infrastructure lifelines 
The CES resulted in 185 fatalities and triggered widespread damage to buildings and city 
infrastructures, especially in the Central Business District (CBD). The events created the 
largest lifeline disruption in 80 years in New Zealand, with severe liquefaction, lateral 
spreading, sand boils, and ejected material ponding on the soil surface in the Christchurch 
urban area. The total economic loss resulting from the CES has been estimated at 
approximately 30 billion New Zealand dollars, which is equivalent to 15% of national GDP 
(O’Rourke et al., 2014). Liquefaction was estimated to have affected over 51,000 residential 
properties, where 15,000 were damaged beyond repair. The CCC received and addressed 
over 36,000 water supply and waste water service requests within the five months following 
the earthquake (Giovinazzi et al., 2011). 
The Christchurch water and waste networks were extensively damaged as a result of the 
CES. Lateral ground movements and vertical settlement resulted in differential movement of 
pipes relative to each other and the surrounding ground or structures. This was 
demonstrated through the loss of grade in gravity pipes and inconsistencies in the invert 
level, resulting in blockage and reducing the network carrying capacity (Cubrinovski et al., 
2011). Structural cracking was evident as leakages at interfaces with rigid structures, and 
joint dislocations resulted in silt and groundwater infiltration. In total, approximately 100 
sewer pump stations and 528 kilometres of sewer pipes were damaged in the city, which 
constituted approximately 31% of the total waste water pipe network length (Liu et al., 
2014). Damage was observed to be more frequent in smaller pipes than larger ones, most 
likely due to thinner pipe walls and a high occurrence of potentially lower-quality fittings in 
pipes with smaller diameters (Cubrinovski et al., 2014). 
The liquefaction-induced angular distortion and horizontal strains from lateral spreading 
during the earthquakes resulted in a complex combination of forces being imposed on 
buried pipes.  O’Rourke et al. (2014) found statistically significant relationships between 
pipe repair rates in buried waste water pipes with angular distortion and lateral ground 
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strain, which they stated would be useful to approximate damage in response to measured 
ground displacements in the future. This is shown in Figure 2-16 below. 
 
Figure 2-16. Comparison of repair rate vs. angular distortion and lateral strain for different 
pipe types: (a) Angular distortion, β ( 10−3) and (b) lateral ground strain, εHP (%) (O’Rourke 
et al., 2014). 
In a subsequent study, (Bouziou & O'Rourke, 2017) incorporated LiDAR data with ground 
motion information to study the effects of transient and permanent ground deformations 
on the Christchurch water distribution system. They concluded that the higher resolution of 
data compared to their 2014 study resulting from the LiDAR data inclusion significantly 
influenced the repair rate to lateral ground strain relationships, and that repair regressions 
and are highly sensitive to the degree of data resolution available. 
In a ground rupture experiment featuring a scaled-down reinforced concrete pipeline by 
Kim et al. (2012), “bending at the pipeline joints closest to the fault plane” was identified as 
one of the highest occurring defect types in conjunction with compression failure associated 
with telescoping-type deformation.  This was indicated by tensile cracking on the tension 
face and possible joint spalling at the compression face. Bending and shear forces resulted 
from differential uplift or settlement of the ground along different lengths of the pipe, 
where the magnitude was largely dependent on bedding material and installation (Edkins et 
al., 2016). 
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Edkins et al. (2016) found that the two most common types of shear acting on the pipe are 
barrel transverse shear and barrel longitudinal shear. Barrel transverse shear is the most 
common kind of shear and occurs when the force is at or near 90 degrees to the pipeline 
axis, and is commonly observed as a transverse break in the middle third of the pipe. Barrel 
longitudinal shear occurs in pipes with insufficient tensile strength when the superimposed 
soil load results in a failure plane close to the spring line. It appears as a longitudinal crack 
orientated horizontally along the pipe barrel adjacent to the joint. 
 
Figure 2-17. Tension cracks occurring at the top wall of the pipe only, indicating bending 
actions due to subsidence of adjacent pipe segments (this study). 
 
Connecting structures such as the presence of lateral adjoining pipes influenced the damage 
observed, and for pipes entering rigid vertical structures, joint pull-out was the most 
frequently observed failure mechanism (Edkins et al., 2016). An example of this is the 
connections between pipelines and manholes or pump stations. Joint failure prevalence 
increased when rubber gaskets mounted on tapered spigots displaced due to large hoop 
stresses being generated. Embedded concrete pipes connecting to a rigid end structure such 
as a manhole also experienced torsional forces when the manhole rotated on a lean.  
Damage was more frequent on spigot and collar joints of segmented reinforced concrete 
pipelines than on the pipe itself (Edkins et al., 2016). These were observed as opened joints, 
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or the thrusting of the spigot of one pipe into the collar of the neighbouring segment, 
resulting in spalling damage. The joint failures are due to axial forces which occur when the 
soil strata changes characteristics, and where the earthquake forces propagating through 
the soils encounter a local change of density and therefore in acceleration. 
Axial forces also occur when forces interact with a pipeline at an angle, when pipes exit 
vertical rigid structures such as pump stations due to different oscillation frequencies, or at 
the junction between underground/above ground pipes (Edkins et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 2-18. Compression forces acting on a joint causing rupture (Edkins et al., 2016) 
About 50 days after the earthquake, a steady state repair rate of four times the pre-quake 
average was reached (O’Rourke et al., 2014). Repairs to the waste water network 
immediately after the initial February 2011 event were delayed to focus of resources on the 
repair of the water supply, and the process was also more complicated than the water 
supply network due to larger installation depths requiring trench support and dewatering 
(Cubrinovski et al., 2011). The daily waste water pipe repairs and cumulative frequency of 
repairs between the February 2011 event and the June 2011 event are shown in Figure 2-19. 




Figure 2-19. Daily repair rate (left) and cumulative repair frequency (right) of waste water 
pipes following the CES (O’Rourke et al., 2014) 
 
2.5 Post-CES waste water system assessment 
This section reviews how the waste water system impacts from the CES were assessed and 
managed. 
Following the CES, the CCC and New Zealand government were confronted with “an almost-
crippled underground waste water system” amidst a significantly damaged horizontal 
infrastructure network. It was determined that a repair programme based on the alliance 
model would result in the greatest efficiency and least risk to undertake the 2.2 billion dollar, 
5.5 year civil construction programme to follow (SCIRT Learning Legacy, 2019). 
This resulted in the formation of the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuilt Team 
(SCIRT), specifically to address the horizontal infrastructure repairs. As mentioned in Section 
1.3, SCIRT consisted of the Christchurch City Council (CCC), New Zealand Transport Agency 
(NZTA) and Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), which were three funding 
organisations where two were asset owners. The other five members were previously-rival 
construction companies (City Care, Downer, Fletcher Construction, Fulton Hogan and 
McConnell Dowell) who undertook the repairs (SCIRT Learning Legacy, 2019).  
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SCIRT followed the Infrastructure Recovery Technical Standards and Guidelines (IRTSG) in 
order to undertake repairs. The document was prepared by CCC engineers to manage the 
technical aspects of the repairs to ensure that the different member companies had a 
unified repair method.  
The IRTSG required the use of the New Zealand Pipe Inspection Manual (NZPIM) for 
assessment of gravity waste water pipes (Heiler et al., 2012). This manual covered the 
inspection of pipelines exclusively using CCTV surveys. The process involves inserting a 
camera mounted rover into a pipe from an access manhole and capturing and transferring 
video recordings to an operator with a screen at the ground surface. A jetting/suction truck 
was often required to clean the pipe of debris and silt infiltration, as shown in Figure 2-20.  
CCTV data have been chosen to represent damage to the waste water network in this study, 
as they are readily available from local territorial authorities that manage waste water 
systems, CCTV surveys are the predominant tool for condition assessment in New Zealand, 
and are fast becoming the primary method to determine the structural and service 
condition of pipes across the world. It is also quick and relatively cheap in comparison to 
alternative survey methods (ProjectMax Ltd, 2006). 




Figure 2-20. Typical example of CCTV operation showing jetting/suction truck with CCTV van, 
retrieved from “Asset Assessment using GIS and InfoNet” by Heiler et al. (2012) 
CCTV surveys in Christchurch following the CES utilised up to 150 full-time equivalent staff 
separated into 20 teams, which was equivalent to half of the national CCTV field resource 
(SCIRT Learning Legacy, 2019). CCTV surveys were often combined with other investigation 
methods such as manhole level surveys, pole cameras and pipe profile assessments. As the 
process was slow and expensive, it was viewed by territorial authorities as a poor return in 
asset assessment in low-damage areas. The physical camera itself also posed some access 
limitations due to pipe size and flow issues (SCIRT Learning Legacy, 2019).  
CCTV survey limitations include any information beyond the interior pipe surface, such as 
thickness or condition of the pipe wall or any cavities outside the pipe. The inspections also 
cannot confirm if a pipe is leaking during dry inspection conditions. Detailed information 
such as dip and pipe grade also could not be reported in older models of CCTV equipment 
(ProjectMax Ltd, 2006).   
The assessment of gravity waste water and storm water pipes contributed over 50% of the 
total cost of the rebuild of horizontal infrastructure in Christchurch, and needed to be 
completed in advance of other infrastructure as they are typically the deepest asset (Heiler 
et al., 2012). 
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2.5.1 Geographic Information Systems and InfoNet 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and associated databases allow disaster researchers 
and stakeholders to manage large quantities of heterogenous data, and facilitate post-
disaster response and situational awareness. GIS began being adopted in Christchurch prior 
to the amalgamation of the CCC in 1990. The earliest such database for waste water pipes 
was affected by three primary issues (Cubrinovski et al., 2014): 
1. Data entry from paper-based records was regarded as a non-specialist task. When 
datasets were merged together in 1990 there was considerable variability in the 
quality of the data produced among the different local boroughs.  
2. After the amalgamation of the CCC, two databases were used, one for managing 
physical infrastructure and one for financial management, When updates were made 
to one, edits did not carry over to the other. 
3. Data capture methods prior to the CES were inefficient and not detailed, therefore 
CCC repair decisions were overwhelmingly based on contractor personal knowledge 
and anecdotal evidence. 
Following the 4 September 2010 earthquake, the CCTV contractors recorded inspections on 
computer-based programs, Cleanflow / WinCan or paper-based log sheets (Christoffersen, 
2012). In order to manage this, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was used by the CCC to 
manage the data and determine whether repairs were required. The original videos and 
CCTV inspection catalogue were stored at the CCC on a network drive. Some of the video 
disks could not be copied to the network drive due to errors (Christoffersen, 2012). 
Following the 22 February 2011 earthquake, significantly more damage occurred and the 
CCC began regarding the CCTV surveys as not only for repair purposes, but for “as-yet-
unknown future requirements” which necessitated a change in the data collection process 
(Christoffersen, 2012). The CCC transferred the pipe inspection priorities and instructions to 
the newly formed SCIRT, and the management responsibility to City Care. All video footage 
assessments began to be catalogued in a database known as InfoNet. The platform was 
used by SCIRT to store both current and historical assessment information by pipe ID, and 
allowed data analysis to compare surveys taken at different times, identify damage trends, 
and compare damage against IRTSG thresholds to determine whether the pipe required 
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renewal, repair or no action (Heiler et al., 2012). The assessment data were also able to be 
presented in an easily accessible form for sharing between project teams, and viewable 
using an in-house online GIS viewer, which was accessed by over 920 users from 20 different 
organisations in 2012 (Heiler et al., 2012). Many of these users developed their own 
spreadsheets that automatically retrieved data from the SCIRT GIS viewer on a daily basis to 
ensure that the latest information was available. 
Following the CES, the CCC GIS database still featured inconsistencies and errors from 
earlier merging efforts. A data validation process called the Feature Manipulation Engine 
(FME) by Safe Software was developed to check that survey details and pipe IDs matched 
between the CCTV catalogue and GIS system. As a result of this process, the percentage 
match of records increased from 75% to 99.6% for the wastewater network, and could be 
used to verify data in SCIRT’s InfoNet (Christoffersen, 2012). The CCC catalogue was later 
migrated from the Excel spreadsheet format to a “SQL database with a web-based front end” 
which allowed easier access, version control and administration (Christoffersen, 2012). This 
database was used to access the CCTV footage used in the survey. 
2.5.2 Standardised Damage Coding in accordance to the New Zealand Pipe Inspection 
Manual 
The New Zealand Pipe Inspection Manual (NZPIM) was first developed in 1989 to provide a 
universal terminology system in New Zealand to assess gravity pipes using CCTV surveys, 
and allows trained assessors to distinguish and assign severity to the damage types 
identified. It is the only document of its type in New Zealand and was originally based on the 
UK Water Research Centre “Manual of Sewer Condition Classification” which was published 
in 1980, and similar inspection documents based on the UK manual have been developed 
around the world from Europe to the USA (ProjectMax Ltd, 2016). The second edition of the 
manual was published in March 1999, and the current edition (third) was produced in 2006 
by ProjectMax Ltd (ProjectMax Ltd, 2006). The damage observed in this thesis was coded in 
accordance with the NZPIM. 
The NZPIM separates the classification of pipe observations into 25 Defect Codes and 14 
Feature Codes (ProjectMax Ltd, 2006). The defect and feature codes are presented in Table 
2-8 and Table 2-9, respectively. 
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Table 2-8. Defect codes in accordance to the NZPIM (ProjectMax Ltd, 2006) 
Code Defect Description 
CC Crack, 
Circumferential 
Cracking occurring at right angles to the pipeline axis. 
Maximum longitudinal length 100mm. If cracking occurs only 
within a joint zone, then it is allocated a Joint Faulty “JF” code. 
CL Crack, 
Longitudinal 
Cracking parallel to the axis of the pipe, which may occur 
anywhere around the circumference. 
CM Crack, Multiple Cracks both circumferential and longitudinal at the same 
longitudinal location in the pipe. The cracks join, but do not 
for “pieces” pipe. 
DE Debris, Silty Silt and gravel deposited within the pipe. 
DF Deformed Pipe Usually applies to a rigid pipe, such as earthenware, asbestos 
cement of concrete pipe deformed by external forces. 
DG Debris, Greasy Refers to grease, fat, scale and all adhering material, except 
encrustation deposits (“ED”). 
DP Dipped Pipe Sagging of the pipeline across more than one pipe section, and 
will have a continuity. Dipped pipes are commonly identified 
by water level changes. 
ED Encrustation 
Deposits 
Encrustation deposits on a pipe wall result from infiltration 
seepage transporting dissolved solids from the surrounding 
soil that are precipitated and deposited on the pipe wall, 
building up over time. Encrustation is often orange due to the 
prevalence of iron oxide in many soils. 
IP Infiltration 
Present 
Visible ground water infiltration from defects either in the 
pipe wall, or at pipe joints. Encrustation Deposits (“ED”) may 
be present, but infiltration appears as wetness or water 
flowing at various rates from seeping, dripping, running, 
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jetting or gushing. 
JD Joint, Displaced Horizontal (left or right) or vertical displacement at a pipe 
joint. The pipe diameter can be used as a guide to the 
percentage of displacement.  
JF Joint, Faulty Joint sealing defects or physical damage at joints within the 
joint zone, excluding open and displaced joints. The joint zone 
is a length of pipe 200mm long, 100mm either side of the joint 
centre. 
JO Joint, Open Pipe sections that are longitudinally displaced and separated 
at joint. Joint width tolerances vary between pipe materials 
and diameter. Open joints do not necessarily equate to faulty 
joint seals. 
LF Lateral, Sealing 
Faulty 
LF applies to any sealing or physical damage occurring within 
the lateral connection zone; an area encompassing the main 




Part of the lateral pipe is protruding into the mainline. 
LX Lateral, Problem Defects identified inside a lateral pipe. 
OP Obstruction, 
Permanent 
An obstruction in the pipeline caused by embedded objects in 
the pipe wall or an object that is not able to be removed using 
standard cleaning equipment and specialist machinery or 
methods are required for its removal. 
OT Obstruction, 
Temporary 
An obstruction in the pipeline, which does not require 
specialist machinery to remove and is not attached nor 
embedded in the pipe wall.  
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PB Pipe, Broken The pipe is still functional as a free-flowing conduit but parts 
of it may have broken out or are displaced from one another 
or could become displaced. More severe than “CM” as 
cracking has extended such that they formed “blocks” of pipe 
that can displace and fall out or lead to a collapsed pipe. 
PF Deformed Plastic 
Pipe 
Plastic pipe, such as PVC, PE or GRP is deformed due to 
pressure or loading, which can include ovality or bulging. 
PH Pipe, Holed A hole which has been intentionally or unintentionally cut or 
punched into the pipe, for example to either gain access or 
during installation of nearby underground services. 
PL Protective Lining 
Defective 
Defect such as bulges, weld failures in the pipe liner which has 
been installed during rehabilitation works.  
PX Pipe, Collapsed The pipe has collapsed and is no longer functional, although 
water may still flow through the rubble of the collapsed pipe. 
RI Root Intrusion Roots growing into the pipe through penetrations or 
openings. 
SD Surface Damage Damage to the interior surface which includes spalling, 
abrasive erosion or chemical and biological corrosion. 
RM Tomo A cavity which exists beyond the pipe wall. The backfill 
surrounding the pipe has been eroded or slumped. Tomos are 
generally caused by a pipe break or hole allowing the material 
into the pipe and running water either inside or outside the 
pipe removing it. 
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Table 2-9. Feature codes in accordance to the NZPIM (ProjectMax Ltd, 2006) 
Code Defect Description 
CF Construction 
Feature 
Construction features are typically drainage fittings (other 
than manholes) installed or constructed as part of, or for the 
purpose of, servicing the pipeline. 
DC Dimension 
Change 
A change in the pipes cross-sectional dimensions. Typically, 
this is the pipe diameter, but could equally relate to the 
shape of the pipe. 
GC General 
Comment 
This code is used to provide any relevant information about 
the inspection at a particular distance in the pipe that is not 
provided for elsewhere, or covered satisfactorily by a defect 
or feature code. 
IA Inspection 
Abandoned 
The finishing code for inspections abandoned prior to 
reaching the end node from a single direction. The reason 
for the abandonment is noted under the “remarks” field. 
IE Inspection Ends The general finishing code for all inspections unless 
abandoned prematurely, in which case the code to be used 
is “IA”. 
IS Inspection Start The first entry for all pipeline inspections. 
LB Lateral Blank A lateral is blank, e.g. an end cap is visible 
LC Lining Change Documents any inserted lining in the original pipe. 
LL Line Deviates Left Documents significant changes in the direction of the 
pipeline towards the left. This can include fittings such as 
bends or changes in alignment through joints or breaks in 
the pipe. 
LR Line Deviates Documents significant changes in the direction of the 
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Right pipeline towards the right. This can include fittings such as 
bends or changes in alignment through joints or breaks in 
the pipe. 
LD Line Deviates 
Down 
Documents significant changes in the grading of the pipeline 
downwards. This can include fittings such as bends or 
changes in alignment through joints or breaks in the pipe. 
LU Line Deviates Up Documents significant changes in the grading of the pipeline 
upwards. This can include fittings such as bends or changes 
in alignment through joints or breaks in the pipe. 
LO Lateral OK Satisfactory lateral connection with no defects is open (ie. 
Not Blank) and would not otherwise attract a condition code 
of LB, LF, LP or LX. 
MC Material Change A change of pipe material. This is typically due to a section of 
the original pipe that has been excavated and replaced as 
part of a repair. 
 
2.6 Summary 
This Chapter has reviewed the various risk components that need to be considered to 
determine the performance of reinforced concrete waste water pipes through the CES. 
 Sections 2.1 and 2.2 focused on the risk component of “exposure”, which in this 
study is defined as the reinforced concrete waste water pipe network in Christchurch. 
The former section presented the history of reinforced concrete pipe design and 
showed that the modern design standard in New Zealand was periodically updated 
in the past century based on design innovations overseas. The latter section focused 
on the Christchurch waste water system and revealed that the geotechnical 
challenges of the region required the formation of a specific organisation in the form 
of the Christchurch Drainage Board in order to construct and expand the network. 
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 Section 2.3 explored the risk component of “vulnerability”, which are multiple 
factors considered to affect the durability and performance of the reinforced 
concrete pipe.  The factors explored include chemical and biological deterioration, 
fabrication and installation methods, above ground and surrounding soil conditions, 
pipe age and dimensions. The extent of existing literature and their findings varied 
depending on the factor under consideration. 
 Section 2.4 presented a general discussion of the risk component of “hazard”, which 
is defined as the CES. The CES caused damage on an unprecedented scale due to 
ground motions, deformations, subsidence and lateral spreading. 
 Section 2.5 explored the tools and methods that enable impact assessment for the 
buried concrete pipes following the “hazard”. The section highlighted the 
importance of databases for managing infrastructural assessments. CCTV surveys 
were the most common choice of assessment, with a clearly defined and 
standardised coding system available in the form of the NZPIM to assess the gravity 
pipe networks. 
The following chapter introduces a method to assess reinforced concrete waste water pipes 
using the assessment tools discussed. The pipe selection process is explained, followed by 
the damage assessment procedure and geospatial analysis. 
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Chapter 3 - Method 
3.1 Pipe subset selection 
As of 2014, Christchurch City had a total of 43,273 waste water pipes with varying materials 
diameters and installation dates; these pipes also spanned a range of mapped liquefaction 
zones of varying severity. For this study, 55 pipes were chosen for assessment based on a 
selection process, with guidance from the CCC. The selection process is illustrated in Figure 
3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1. The pipe selection process used in this study. 
 
As discussed in section 2.5.1, CCC currently keeps track of CCTV data in a database. At the 
time of data retrieval, the total number of pipes for which SCIRT conducted post-CES CCTV 
analysis was 24,103 pipes (approximately 46% of the total network). The total number of 
pipes for which pre-CES CCTV surveys had been conducted was 12,475 pipes, with most of 
the surveys having been conducted between 1990-2010. 
The post-CES CCTV recordings were entirely available in digital format and a backup was 
kept in the CCC archives, readily accessible for viewing. However, for the pre-CES recordings, 
due to older technologies being used at the time, these were stored either digitally in an 
archived folder (referred by CCC as ‘DVD’) or on physical video tapes (referred by CCC as 
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‘VHS’) where a digital backup was not kept. The ‘VHS’ tapes were not accessible as their 
physical locations were not known and thus all CCTV records which referred to the ‘VHS’ 
format were unable to be used. Therefore, despite the large number of pipes surveyed, 
most of the pre-CES CCTV footage were lost, corrupted or otherwise inaccessible. 
In order to confirm the availability of matching pre-CES and post-CES ‘DVD’ footage, the 
InfoNet and current CCC databases were merged. Once the databases were compared, the 
total number of waste water pipes that had matching and retrievable pre-CES inspections 
and post-CES CCTV footage was only 645 pipes (approximately 1.5% of the total network). 
Discussions were held with the CCC to discuss how to further refine the selection of pipes. It 
was agreed to limit the scope of the research to study parameters such as pipe diameter 
and installation date by keeping the material constant. Therefore, it was agreed to focus on 
reinforced concrete (CONC or RCRR depending on reference) as it was considered to provide 
the widest variations in diameter, wall thickness, installation age and distribution. In 
addition, the material is still widely used in Christchurch for trunk mains, and is also the 
predominant material used in cities elsewhere in New Zealand and throughout the world. 
After discussions with the CCC, it was also decided to limit the research to pipes in 
Christchurch residential areas. This was to exclude pipes in industrial areas, where 
contaminated and corrosive discharges may over time have led to encrustations and 
degradation that would obscure pre-CES and post-CES damage. Spatial data of the CCC land 
use zones were used to exclude all pipes in industrial areas. Following this procedure, 238 
reinforced concrete pipes remained for residential land use areas with readily retrievable 
pre- and post-CES CCTV footage. 




Figure 3-2. Pipe selection in and around Christchurch City overlaid with LRI zones, LRI map by (Cubrinovski et al., 2014)  
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23532 150 1954 3 20-50 20-40 22355 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 
8033 150 1955 3 20-50 20-40 22356 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 
9082 150 1955 3 20-50 20-40 22357 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 
9088 150 1955 3 20-50 20-40 22358 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 
9090 150 1955 3 20-50 20-40 22366 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 
9543 150 1955 3 20-50 20-40 22367 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 
9544 150 1955 3 20-50 20-40 22368 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 
9550 150 1955 2 50-250 40-200 22370 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 
22636 150 1955 2 50-250 40-200 22374 225 1951 0 >500 >400 
17591 150 1956 3 20-50 20-40 24086 225 1954 3 20-50 20-40 
17604 150 1956 2 50-250 40-200 23458 225 1958 3 20-50 20-40 
24216 150 1958 3 20-50 20-40 20161 225 1960 3 20-50 20-40 
24217 150 1958 3 20-50 20-40 22372 250 1951 1 250-500 200-400 
24218 150 1958 3 20-50 20-40 24284 375 1956 3 20-50 20-40 
24219 150 1958 3 20-50 20-40 22773 450 1952 2 50-250 40-200 
24220 150 1958 3 20-50 20-40 22781 450 1952 0 >500 >400 
24221 150 1958 3 20-50 20-40 23791 450 1952 0 >500 >400 
24224 150 1958 3 20-50 20-40 10319 450 1956 3 20-50 20-40 
9125 150 1958 3 20-50 20-40 10324 450 1956 3 20-50 20-40 
9126 150 1958 3 20-50 20-40 10326 450 1956 3 20-50 20-40 
6267 150 1959 3 20-50 20-40 1119 450 1960 3 20-50 20-40 
22329 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 1120 450 1960 3 20-50 20-40 
22330 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 21157 450 1991 0 >500 >400 
22331 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 21165 450 1991 0 >500 >400 
22333 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 21166 450 1991 0 >500 >400 
22352 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 11440 900 1955 2 50-250 40-200 
22353 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 11442 900 1955 2 50-250 40-200 
22354 225 1950 1 250-500 200-400 
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Finally, 55 pipes were selected to include variation in pipe diameter, age of installation and 
LRI. Figure 3-2 shows the spatial distribution of the final pipes selected for analysis, and the 
pipe specifications are presented in Table 3-1. 
CCTV data were chosen to represent damage to the waste water pipes under investigation, 
as is the data are territorial authorities that manage waste water systems, CCTV surveys are 
the predominant tool for condition assessment in New Zealand, and are fast becoming the 
primary method to determine the structural and service condition of pipes across the world. 
CCTV surveys are also quick and relatively cheap in comparison to alternative survey 
methods (ProjectMax Ltd, 2006). 
3.2 Damage analysis 
I received official CCTV training with Project Max on 26 July 2017, with the professionally 
registered role being CCTV Reviewer. The training was based on the NZPIM, and covered the 
CCTV inspection procedure of gravity pipes and the identification, grading and reporting of 
pipe features and defects. Familiarity with the NZPIM is considered to be essential for 
professionals involved in CCTV operation, contract administration or pipe condition 
assessment. 
First the pre-CES footage was reviewed, and the starting and finish manholes were recorded 
and the inspection date was noted. The manhole IDs are the access points and are used to 
check whether the inspection direction was upstream or downstream.   
The recorded footage was viewed as the camera travelled from the starting manhole to the 
finishing manhole. When a construction feature, anomaly or damage item was observed by 
the original CCTV operator at the time of survey, they paused the camera and oriented it 
towards the target for a clearer view, and proceeded to rotate the camera to identify the 
extent of the damage. For example, if a faulty joint was suspected, the camera would rotate 
from where the damage was most visible and proceed slowly around the entire pipe joint to 
identify if the whole joint was damaged or whether the damage was localised.  




Figure 3-3. Typical screenshot of CCTV footage with on-screen information explained. The 
format and extent of the on-screen information varied between different contractors and 
often differed between pre-CES and post-CES footage. 
For this research, the damage items were coded with two-letter abbreviations depending on 
damage type and assigned a severity code (refer to Table 2-8 and Table 2-9 for further 
information regarding the codes). The distance along the pipe where the damage was 
observed was written down, along with the standard ‘clock’ position from the 12 o’clock 
point. 
The footage was inspected until either the finish manhole was reached, or no more footage 
was available due to the presence of water or other obstructions; the length of the final 
available footage was noted. The post-CES footage of the same pipe was then reviewed. If 
for any reason only partially complete footage was available due to a technical issue, the 
damage observations were only considered for analysis if footage existed at this location in 
both the pre- and post-CES CCTV footage. Damage observations in areas of incomplete 
footage were discarded from the analysis, but were included in the damage logs for 
completeness and reference purposes. 
Current Pipe Inclination Current distance travelled 
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After the pipe footage was reviewed, the damage codes were classified as being structurally 
significant or insignificant. This was achieved using an evaluation table provided by the CCC 
(Table 3-2). The damage codes that are structurally significant are located at the top of the 
table.  Depending on the nature of damage and its assigned severity (Small, Medium or 
Large), a score from 1 to 5 was assigned; the higher the score, the more urgency existed to 
address the damage item from an asset management perspective. For example, an IP score 
of either Medium or Large is given a score of 5, as it indicates the presence of a crack 
extending through the wall of the pipe. The colours in the table cells provide a quick visual 
indication of the score. The codes that are structurally or operationally insignificant are 
located near the bottom of the table and shaded in grey. 
A pipe summary score was calculated for each pre- and post-CES CCTV inspection for each 
pipe. This value enabled ease of comparison between pre-CES and post-CES footage, where 
a high score following the CES indicates that the pipe has experienced damage. The 
summary score is given by the total sum of each damage item multiplied by its 
corresponding the severity score from Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2. Damage code severity table (provided by the CCC) 
Code Definition S M L Code Definition S M L 
IP Infiltration Present 4 5 5 DE Debris, Silty NA NA NA 
JD Joint, Displaced 2 3 5 DG Debris, Greasy NA NA NA 
PB Pipe, Broken 3 4 5 PF Deformed Plastic 
Pipe 
NA NA NA 
PH Pipe, Holed 2 3 5 ED Encrustation 
Deposits 
NA NA NA 
PL Protective Lining 
Defective 
2 3 5 OT Obstruction, 
Temporary 
NA NA NA 
PX Pipe, Collapsed NA NA 5 CF Construction 
Feature 
NA NA NA 
RI Root Intrusion 4 4 5 DC Dimension Change NA NA NA 
TM Tomo NA NA 5 GC General Comment NA NA NA 
CM Crack, Multiple 2 3 3 IA Inspection 
Abandoned 
NA NA NA 
CC Crack, Circumferential 1 3 3 IE Inspection Ends NA NA NA 
CL Crack, Longitudinal 1 3 3 IS Inspection Start NA NA NA 
JF Joint, Faulty 2 3 3 LB Lateral Blank NA NA NA 
JO Joint, Open 2 2 3 LC Lining Change NA NA NA 
LF Lateral, Sealing Faulty 2 3 3 LL Line Deviates Left NA NA NA 
LX Lateral, Problem 2 3 3 LR Line Deviates Right NA NA NA 
LP Lateral, Protruding 2 3 3 LD Line Deviates Down NA NA NA 
DF Deformed Pipe NA 3 5 LU Line Deviates Up NA NA NA 
PF Deformed Plastic Pipe 2 3 3 LO Lateral OK NA NA NA 
SD Surface Damage 2 2 4 MC Material Change NA NA NA 
OP Obstruction, 
Permanent 
2 2 4 DP Dipped Pipe NA NA NA 
 
3.3 Assigning geospatial information to pipes 
The following geospatial data were assigned to each pipe to enable interpretation of pipe 
damage: 
 Pipe Locations (from CCC); 
 Manhole locations (from CCC); 
 Pipe damage locations and failure modes (this analysis);  
 LiDAR-derived differential ground movements (New Zealand Geotechnical Database, 
2012); 
 Peak Ground Accelerations and Peak Ground Velocities (Bradley & Hughes, 2012). 
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The pipes were discretised into one metre segments along their length, where the distance 
along the pipe featuring a damage observation was rounded to the nearest metre. This was 
done in order to adjust for some minor discrepancies between the starting distances of the 
footage before and after the earthquakes so that the damage items could be spatially 
compared. The reason for the discrepancies was that the distance counter on the CCTV 
footage was not calibrated to a specific datum to represent the 0.0 m starting measurement, 
and the reported distances of repeat CCTV footage are often out of sync from one another 
by up to 1 metre in the worst observed cases. Therefore, to ensure that fixed location 
construction features, such as laterals, were aligned when comparing the pre- and post-CES 
footages, some distance rounding and adjustment was necessary.  
The starting and finishing manholes for each pipe were chosen based on gradient and hence 
flow direction by gravity. For instances when the different CCTV surveys before and after 
the earthquake started from opposite manholes, the reporting distance was always chosen 
to be that from the starting manhole of the flow direction, so that both pre- and post-CES 
CCTV observations were spatially comparable when visually plotted. The manholes were 
also used to ensure consistency in starting and ending observations between pre- and post-
CES records. 
In order to distinguish between the pre- and post-CES observations, the pre-CES footage 
was plotted as squares while the post-CES footage was plotted as circles. The circles were 
chosen to be slightly smaller (size 5) than the squares (size 12) in order to allow both sets of 
observations to be visible when overlaid. Damage codes were also plotted adjacent to the 
location along the pipe for identification. The severity-based colour coding in Table 3-2 was 
adopted in the GIS software. 
When more than one damage item existed at a single location, the damage item with the 
highest severity rating was plotted as only one item was visible at a time. This occurred 
frequently for certain damage codes such as IP (Infiltration Present) or ED (Encrustation 
Deposit), which are always accompanied by crack codes or joint damage codes due to the 
nature of the damage itself, as these items indicate complete penetrations in the pipe walls 
allowing external water to enter and cause gushing (IP) or rusting (ED). 




Figure 3-4. Typical pipe (Pipe ID 6267 shown) with damage observations mapped along the 
length of the pipe. World imagery map layer retrieved from Esri (2018). See Table 3-2 for 
explanation of damage codes.  
Figure 3-4 shows an example pipe (ID 6267) with the pre- and post-CES damage 
observations colour-coded, labelled with NZPIM damage codes and distributed spatially 
along the length of the pipe between the manholes. 
Because it is not possible to attribute specific damage observations to individual 
earthquakes within the 2010-2011 CES, and all post-CES CCTV observations were in any case 
conducted from early 2012, any CCTV damage observations attributable to earthquakes are 
impacts integrated over the entire CES period. Therefore the primary LiDAR ground 
deformation (vertical movement) data used here were for the period pre-4th September 
2010 (2003) to post-23rd December 2011 (New Zealand Geotechnical Database, 2012). 
However, the spatial extent of these data does not cover all of Christchurch City. Where 
these vertical movement data were not available for particular pipes because they were 
located outside the spatial extent of combined LiDAR flight campaigns for the entire CES 
period, a second database was used that covered the period post-4th September 2010 (5th 
September 2010) to post-23rd December 2011 (New Zealand Geotechnical Database, 2012). 
Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6 show the spatial extent of these databases. 




Figure 3-5. Pipe selection showing extent of Pre-2010 to Post Dec 2011 LiDAR data availability. LiDAR data retrieved from (New Zealand 
Geotechnical Database, 2012) "Vertical Ground Surface Movements", Map Layer CGD0600 - 23 July 2012, from https://www.nzgd.org.nz/ 




Figure 3-6. Final Pipe selection showing extent of Post-2010 to Post Feb 2011 LiDAR data availability. LiDAR data retrieved from (New Zealand 
Geotechnical Database, 2012) "Vertical Ground Surface Movements", Map Layer CGD0600 - 23 July 2012, from https://www.nzgd.org.nz
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Using spatial analyst tools in GIS, differential ground movements were extracted to points at 
1 metre intervals along the length of the pipe. In this instance, negative raster values 
indicate ground subsidence and positive raster values indicate uplift. The differential ground 
settlements were plotted along the axis of the pipe along with both pre and post-CES 
damage observations. 
A summary of the analysis results using the method discussed in this section is presented in 
the following Chapter. Pipe damage observations are analysed and summaries compared 
regarding various pipe parameters. 
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Chapter 4 - Results and Discussion 
This chapter presents the assessment results from the method outlined in Chapter 3. 
Working backwards from available evidence observed, relationships and insights were 
drawn regarding the broader topics discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2. 
4.1 Pipe summary score 
For each pipe, the number of observations were counted in both pre- and post-CES footage. 
Each individual observation was given a severity in accordance to Table 3-2 and the 
severities were tallied for all observations for both sets of footage to give a resultant score. 
The tallies are given below in Table 4-1, and the differences in number of observations and 
total score is also given. Positive changes indicate an increase in the number of damage 
observations and greater damage score level, which consequently means the overall 
severity of damage in the pipe has increased; the number represents the corresponding 
magnitude of increase. 
Table 4-1 shows that for all but three of the pipes, the number of observations either 
increased or stayed the same following the CES. Also, all but one pipe resulted in an increase 
in the total damage score. This is a clear indication that the CES resulted in increased 
cumulative damage to the concrete gravity waste water pipelines. It is considered that the 
pipes with a decrease in the total damage score was a result of repairs which were 
undertaken between the pre-CES and post-CES surveys. 
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23532 150 1 3 4 9 3 6 22355 225 3 5 7 21 4 16 
8033 150 6 13 17 42 11 29 22356 225 4 8 5 10 1 2 
9082 150 5 12 7 17 2 5 22357 225 3 7 4 11 1 4 
9088 150 4 10 7 17 3 7 22358 225 5 9 6 15 1 6 
9090 150 3 7 4 9 1 2 22366 225 6 11 4 12 -2 1 
9543 150 4 9 5 12 1 3 22367 225 3 6 7 19 4 13 
9544 150 9 24 9 24 0 0 22368 225 4 8 8 29 4 21 
9550 150 2 7 3 7 1 0 22370 225 10 19 9 25 -1 6 
22636 150 2 4 32 109 30 105 22374 225 5 13 9 25 4 12 
17591 150 0 0 1 2 1 2 24086 225 0 0 2 7 2 7 
17604 150 4 10 11 27 7 17 23458 225 0 0 2 4 2 4 
24216 150 3 6 10 20 7 14 20161 225 1 2 5 10 4 8 
24217 150 4 8 12 30 8 22 22372 250 5 14 11 25 6 11 
24218 150 4 8 17 42 13 34 24284 375 1 2 2 5 1 3 
24219 150 0 0 3 6 3 6 22773 450 2 4 12 26 10 22 
24220 150 1 2 4 8 3 6 22781 450 9 31 13 41 4 10 
24221 150 3 6 7 15 4 9 23791 450 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24224 150 1 2 9 17 8 15 10319 450 5 10 8 14 3 4 
9125 150 3 7 19 52 16 45 10324 450 1 2 6 12 5 10 
9126 150 0 0 7 15 7 15 10326 450 4 8 6 11 2 3 
6267 150 2 4 15 39 13 35 1119 450 2 4 6 15 4 11 
22329 225 9 18 23 75 14 57 1120 450 3 6 3 7 0 1 
22330 225 9 19 9 23 0 4 21157 450 1 2 13 34 12 32 
22331 225 2 7 9 21 7 14 21165 450 0 0 8 21 8 21 
22333 225 5 10 12 29 7 19 21166 450 3 7 8 20 5 13 
22352 225 4 11 4 11 0 0 11440 900 1 3 4 12 3 9 
22353 225 3 6 7 17 4 11 11442 900 5 15 3 11 -2 -4 
22354 225 5 8 12 28 7 20 
         
Chapter 4 – Results and Discussion 
77 
 
4.2 Damage type observations 
The most common types of damage observed are presented in this section. For definitions 
of the defect codes refer to Table 2-8. 
Figure 4-1 presents the pre-CES defect codes in order of observation frequency. Surface 
Damage (SD) was the most common observation, and was more than three times the 
frequency of the next most frequent damage type observed (defect in the lateral pipes). 
Surface damage is one of the most obvious examples of chemical and biological 
deterioration discussed in section 2.3.1 in accordance with the NZPIM (ProjectMax Ltd, 
2006), and therefore this result is in line with expectations as most pre-CES damage is 
considered to be the result of deterioration. The pre-CES damage may also be attributed to 
disturbances from above ground construction and traffic over the years as presented in 
section 2.3.4. 
 
Figure 4-1. Pre-CES damage code in order of observation frequency 
Figure 4-2 presents the post-CES defect codes in order of observation frequency. Surface 
Damage (SD) was again the most common type of observation, however all other damage 
types are much more frequent, especially damage to the main pipe joints and lateral joints 
such as LX, JF and LF.  This agrees with assessment outcomes by O'Reilly et al. (1989; Section 
2.3.2) in which joints were generally more vulnerable to damage than the pipe body. 




Figure 4-2. Post-CES damage code in order of observation frequency 
 
4.3 Potential influence of ground deformation on pipe damage 
For each of the 55 pipes included in Table 4-1, a detailed pipe damage map was produced 
that included the damage along the distance of the pipe both pre- and post-CES, compared 
against the LiDAR-derived vertical ground movements obtained from the New Zealand 
Geotechnical Database (2012).  
For the damage observations, the X-axis indicates the distance along the pipe from the 
designated “starting” manhole to the “finish” manhole. The Y-axis of the upper chart 
indicates the magnitude of differential ground movement recorded in metres. For each 
observation the corresponding NZPIM damage code is shown at the same distance along the 
pipe in the lower chart. The colour coding indicates damage severity in accordance with 
Table 3 2. Pre-CES results are shown as squares and post-CES results are shown as circles, as 
previously mentioned. Where applicable the vertical black line shows the distance along the 
pipe up to which footage was available for both the pre- and post-CES CCTV footage; no 
observations were recorded after the vertical black line. 
The full results for pipe damage maps and transects are presented in Appendix B. Certain 
damage observations frequently occurred at locations of obvious differential settlement, as 
highlighted by the yellow bars in Figure 4-3 below. Multiple points of differential ground 
movement (up to 0.2 m) were recorded to the ground surface for this pipe. At many of 
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these locations damage items such as lateral pipe failures, infiltrations and broken segments 
were identified. 
 
Figure 4-3. Damage observations for pipe 22636 
To further illustrate this the apparent coincidence of differential ground movement and 
damage locations, another example (pipe 6267) is presented in Figure 4-4. Similar to the 
previous example, damage corresponded to areas of high differential ground movement. In 
this case the observations were lateral pipe failures and joint failures. 
 
Figure 4-4. Damage observation for pipe 6267 
Qualitatively, the differential ground deformations align with a high frequency of post-CES 
damage in certain pipes. However, for the whole sample set the differential ground 
deformation did not necessarily predict increased damage occurring at these points. It is 
suggested that damage frequency in relation to ground deformation could be more 
pronounced with a larger sample set, and a more systematic and rigorous method of 
associating damage with ground deformation should be developed. 
Due to this approach of visually plotting ground deformation inflection points to 
corresponding damage at a particular location, continuous damage (such as continuous 
surface damage of the pipe walls) could not be effectively represented, and therefore the 
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extent and severity of certain damage types such as continuous CL (longitudinal cracking) or 
SD (surface damage) may be currently under-represented. 
The LiDAR survey also features multiple sources of error resulting from data collection to 
interpolation as discussed in 2.4.2. This is also likely to have an impact on ground 
deformation measurement accuracy.  
4.4 Influence of Pipe Dimensions 
Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6, respectively, show the change in number of observations and 
total damage score when compared with pipe diameter.  The results are also averaged and 
summarised in Table 4-2 for the major pipe diameter groups. 











Average change in 





150 21 2.9 6.8 6.8 18.0 
225 19 4.3 8.8 8.8 11.8 
250 1 5.0 14.0 6.0 11.0 
375 1 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 
450 11 2.7 6.7 4.8 11.5 
900 2 3.0 9.0 0.5 2.5 
 




Figure 4-5. Change in the number of observations post-CES, plotted according to diameter 
 
Figure 4-6. Change in total score post-CES, plotted according to diameter 
From the results, smaller pipes appeared to exhibit more earthquake-related damage 
compared to larger ones. This is likely due to increased wall thickness and quantity of steel 
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reinforcing in larger-diameter pipes, which increases flexural and shear strength as 
mentioned by Wong and Nehdi (2018) as presented in section 2.3.6. 
The pipe diameter range available for this study covers all three pipe fabrication methods 
mentioned in section 2.3.2, and it cannot be confirmed with certainty which fabrication 
method was used for any given pipe. However, one can infer that the Vibration Technology 
method was probably not represented in this study, as it was introduced very recently and 
primarily reserved for diameters larger than 675 mm. The other two methods (centrifugal 
spun and roller suspension) have overlapping diameter ranges and timeframes, and thus 
were equally likely to have been implemented and cannot be compared with regards to pipe 
performance. 
Some diameter classes in this study could not be properly represented. For example, there 
is only one pipe in each of the 225 mm and 375 mm diameter classes, and two pipes in total 
in the 900 mm diameter class. Therefore, further research is recommended using a larger 
sample set so that each diameter class is properly represented in order to understand the 
relationship between pipe dimensions and earthquake performance. 
4.5 Influence of deterioration 
For many pipes, a significant level of damage existed prior to the CES. This is likely 
attributable to chemical and biological deterioration processes discussed in Section 2.3.1.  
To determine if damage due to deterioration prior to the CES had any effect on the damage 
attributed to the CES, existing damage prior to the CES was compared with the total change 
in number of observations and scores. These are presented in the following tables.  
Table 4-3. Change in the number of damage observations post-CES with respect to number 
of damage observations pre-CES 
Average pre-EQ no. of damage 
observations 
Number of pipes Average change in number of 
damage observations 
0 to 1 15 4.1 
2 to 3 16 6.9 
4 to 5 17 3.9 
6 to 7 2 4.5 
8 to 9 4 4.5 
10+ 1 -1.0* 
 *This suggests that repair works were undertaken  
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Table 4-4. Change in total score post-CES, with respect to pre-CES total score 
Average pre-EQ score Number of pipes Average change in score 
0 to 4 19 16.7 
5 to 9 20 12.7 
10 to 14 10 10.5 
15 to 19 4 15.8 
20 to 24 1 0.0 
25+ 1 10.0 
 
No relationships were identified between the level of damage due to deterioration with 
damage increase following the CES. This may that the level of pre-CES deterioration in 
reinforced concrete pipes had no effect on earthquake performance. However, a larger 
sample set will need to be assessed before any firm conclusions can be drawn. 
4.6 Influence of year of installation 
The year of installation is a potential influence on the damage observations. Figure 4-7 and 
Figure 4-8 show the total pre-CES number of observations and damage score, respectively, 
plotted against the original year of installation. The net change in number of observations 
and damage score through the earthquake sequences are also plotted in Figure 4-9 and 
Figure 4-10 respectively. The figures show that most pipes were constructed between 1950 
and 1960, and only three other pipes were constructed outside this category in 1991, which 
is 31 years later. 




Figure 4-7. No. of pre-CES observations and year of installation 
 
Figure 4-8. Total pre-CES score and year of installation 




Figure 4-9. Change in the number of observations post-CES, plotted according to year of 
installation 
 
Figure 4-10. Change in total score post-CES, plotted according to year of installation 
Design standards governing pipe specifications varied depending on year of installation, as 
discussed in Section 2.1.1, therefore the pipes have been classified in accordance with the 
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applicable buried pipe standard and concrete pipe standard. The applicable buried pipe 
standards are presented in Table 4-5. 

















































0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
It appears that all but three of the pipes were designed to A35:1937 and A35:1957. 
Therefore, most pipes in the study were expected to have been designed using the ‘indirect 
method’, which is based on Spangler’s (1933) bedding configurations and described in 
Section 2.1.1. The pipes installed prior to 1957 were all assumed to be designed to strength 
Class X, however there is a probability that some of the pipes constructed after 1957 were 
designed to the stronger Classes Y and Z, which were additions to A35:1957. This cannot be 
confirmed and therefore its effect cannot be gauged in this study. 
The other three pipes selected which were constructed in 1991 were assumed to be 
designed to AS/NZS 3725:1989, which has incorporated the findings from SPIDA and the 
‘direct method’. This could indicate that these pipes were designed using a different 
methodology than the others, however this is not necessarily the case because Spangler’s 
bedding configurations were widely used until the 1990s. Nevertheless, the three newer 
pipes show a smaller average change in score through the CES compared to the earliest 
pipes, which may indicate the advantages of the ‘direct method’ compared to the ‘indirect 
method’ for earthquake performance. Given the regional differences in backfill method as 
per Table 2-6 it is also likely that the three newest pipes were specified with AP20 or AP40 
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backfills while the older pipes were backfilled with native soils, however this could not be 
confirmed. 
The pipes have also been classified in accordance with the applicable concrete pipe 
standard. This is presented in Table 4-6 below. 

















































0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
For most pipes, the concrete pipe standard was synonymous with the buried pipe standard, 
with the exception of the three pipes constructed in 1991, which were most likely designed 
to NZS3107:1978. The water tightness specification changed for NZS3107:1978 which 
affected the three 1991 pipes, therefore their water tightness performance is considered to 
be marginally improved compared to the older pipes (10 m compared to 9.1 m for the 
latter).  
Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 show that pipes installed to older standards have a higher average 
number of pre-CES damage observations and scores compared to newer pipes, suggesting 
more deterioration has occurred, which is in line with expectations and existing literature on 
deterioration, such as the research from O'Reilly et al. (1989) presented in section 2.3.5. 
Newer pipes have also been subject to less time for the chemical and biological processes 
outlined in Section 2.3.1 to occur, while also benefitting from improved concrete mix 
designs in later design standards due to overseas innovations discussed in Section 2.1.1.   
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As the concrete mix specification for each pipe was not available, the mix parameters, such 
as chloride and sulphate content, aggregate type and size, cannot be associated with pipe 
performance as these parameters have overlapping acceptable ranges between the 
standards.  
As with other performance interpretations presented above, it is expected that with a larger 
sample pool these results would become more pronounced and the relationships more 
evident. 
4.7 Influence of liquefaction 
The susceptibility of soils to liquefaction-induced ground deformation has been 
demonstrated to influence broader network performance, as reported by O’Rourke et al. 
(2014) and Cubrinovski et al. (2014). 
Detailed soil or backfill descriptions for each pipe were not obtainable. However, the backfill 
specifications are assumed to have been specified in accordance to Table 2-6. The best 
indication of surrounding soil response conditions in this study is considered to be the 
liquefaction zone as defined in Section 2.4.1.2. 
The following figures show the change in number of observations and total score when 
compared against the LRI zone in which the pipe is located.  The results are also averaged 
and summarised in Table 4-7 for the major LRI zone groups. 










Average change in 





0 6 3.0 8.8 5.5 14.7 
1 16 5.0 10.4 3.6 12.8 
2 6 2.7 7.2 8.2 24.8 
3 27 2.6 5.7 4.7 11.3 
 




Figure 4-11. Number of pre-CES observations and LRI Zone 
 
Figure 4-12. Total pre-CES score and year of installation 




Figure 4-13. Change in the number of observations post-CES, plotted according to 
liquefaction zone 
 
Figure 4-14. Change in total score post-CES, plotted according to liquefaction zone 
From the results, there is no clear trend in damage with LRI zone; all LRI zones have 
overlapping ranges of increase in scores. This does not align with previous studies by 
Cubrinovski et al. (2014). However, LRI zones are only general categories developed during 
the CES itself to guide designers in their thinking on more resilient system design, and were 
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not intended to capture or predict high-resolution ground movements. As evidenced by the 
limitations of LiDAR data discussed in section 2.4.2, there is significant spatial heterogeneity 
on ground deformation within each LRI zone. The sample size for certain liquefaction zones 
such as 0 and 2 are also very low (6 pipes in each zone), therefore it is expected that a larger 
sample size would result in clearer relationships for liquefaction zone. 
4.8 Influence of seismic ground motions 
Seismic ground motions are considered to affect the performance of the pipes directly, as 
discussed in Section 2.4.1.1. This section presents the estimated PGA and PGV values from 
Bradley and Hughes (2012) with the change in number of damage observations and damage 
scores.  
As no CCTV observations were undertaken immediately subsequent to each major CES 
event, specific damage observations were unable to be associated with specific earthquakes. 
However, if we assume that the maximum estimated PGA and PGV values across the major 
earthquake events are the primary causative factor influencing observed damage in the 
post-CES CCTV inspections, then we can check for relationships between pipe performance 
and ground motions. The maximum estimated PGA and PGV values are summarised below 
in Table 4-8 and Table 4-9, respectively, and compared with the average change in damage 
observation number and score. 






Average change in number of 
damage observations 
Average change in score 
0.0-0.2 0 N/A N/A 
0.2-0.4 15 5.4 14.1 
0.4-0.6 29 4.3 13.8 
>0.6 11 5.4 12.4 
 








Average change in number of 
damage observations 
Average change in score 
0-20 0 NA NA 
20-40 7 7.6 19.7 
40-60 33 3.5 10.7 
>60 15 6.4 17.1 
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Figure 4-15 and Figure 4-16 show the maximum estimated PGA plotted against change in 
number of observations and damage score, respectively, for each individual pipe. Figure 
4-17 and Figure 4-18 show equivalent plots for maximum estimated PGV. 
 
Figure 4-15. Change in number of observations and max PGA through the CES 
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 Figure 4-16. Change in total score and Peak Ground Acceleration through the CES 
 
Figure 4-17. Change in number of observations and Maximum PGV through the CES 
 
 
Figure 4-18. Change in total damage score and PGV through the CES 




From the results, there is no clear trend in damage with PGA or PGV. For a given value of
PGA or PGV, pipes can undergo either very small or large increases in damage score. An
explanation for this may be that these parameters are calculated as probability distributions
constrained by the actual measurements from accelerometers and strong motion stations,
as outlined in Section 2.4.1.1, hence the accuracy of prediction is reduced with increasing
distance from these instruments as stated by Bradley and Hughes (2012). With a sample size
of only 55 pipes, where many are located at a considerable distance from instruments
shown in GeoNet’s continuous GNSS network in Figure 2-10, the accuracy may be limited in
this case. In addition, seismic force exerted on the pipe is not only a function of the ground
motion, but also the transient local soil characteristics and displacements, which have their
own inherent uncertainties (Refer to Section 2.4.1). Further research is recommended using




The CCTV damage assessment method has inherent limitations in the scope and accuracy of
data which it is able to collect. These limitations were outlined in Section 2.5.1.  The
intention of the CCTV survey is for qualitative decision-making purposes for local councils;
hence defects observed this way are not readily amenable to being quantified nor measured.
Likewise, the NZPIM rating system of Small (S), Medium (M) and Large (L) to indicate
severity is mainly intended for high-level repair pricing purposes (ProjectMax Ltd, 2006).
In this research one observer (Y. Tang) was responsible for interpretation of all CCTV footage. 
In this way all footage would have been interpreted equivalently, avoiding the error 
resulting from differences in subjective opinion from multiple assessors. However, until an 
assessment method exists which can more rigorously quantify the damage observed, CCTV 
footage interpretation is relatively subjective regarding the classification and severity of a 
damage item, as the sole method to determine this is visually on screen. Further, the 
footage was recorded by a variety of other camera operators, and there was no quality 
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control in the rigour with which the original footage was captured (see Section 4.9.2 below). 
For some sections of the pipes inspected, the quality of the video footage was questionable 
at best. Some of the older CCTV inspections were also more prone to motion blur and had 
reduced clarity at low light levels. The cleanliness of the pipe was also influential in the 
interpretation of the results, as well as the level of flow during the inspection. Pipes which 
were covered with silty debris or fat deposits may hide cracks underneath.  
As all CCTV footage is retrieved from the pipe interior, it is not possible to determine 
information beyond the inside wall of the pipe, such as whether a crack extends through the 
thickness of the wall. Therefore, the actual severity of cracks and joint damage could not be 
directly observed, but needed to be inferred from secondary effects such as the presence of 
infiltration or staining.  
 
Figure 4-19(a) Encrustation and running flow from opened joint, (b) groundwater infiltration 
from significant circumferential cracking 
The above photos show evidence of secondary effects, which are associated with damage 
that has penetrated the thickness of the pipe walls. Figure 4-19(a) shows an opened joint 
where encrustation deposits could be observed, which results from infiltration seepage 
from the surrounding soil. The precipitated salts present in the seepage build up over time 
in large orange deposits as moisture evaporates. Figure 4-19(b) shows groundwater has 
permeated the pipe walls to enter the pipe interior. When secondary effects are not obvious, 
such as when the ground water table is below the depth of the pipe so no leaking occurs, 
the severity of pipe cracking is not able to be inferred from secondary effects and is again 
dependent on the video quality. 
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As the distance counter on the CCTV footage was not calibrated to a specific datum to 
represent the 0.0 m starting measurement, the reported distances of repeat CCTV footage 
are often out of sync from one another by up to 1 metre in the worst observed cases. This 
was identified when comparing the distances of laterals along the pipe between inspections, 
which do not change, but had margins of error of up to 1.0 metre. To ensure that the 
distance along the pipe of damage items are interpreted correctly, the pre-CES and post-CES 
footage needed to be aligned such that the laterals match across the footage. In this study, 
the reported distance from each CCTV inspection was rounded to the nearest metre as 
discussed in section 3.3, but some manual adjustments were still required to ensure that the 
reported distances at laterals were aligned. 
Pipe dip was unable to be considered in this study and compared with LiDAR-derived ground 
deformations due to the inability of pre-CES cameras having the means of reporting this. 
Assessors typically observed the water line angle in the pipe as an indication of the dip angle 
prior to the availability of camera mounted tilt sensors, however this is cannot be quantified 
and was therefore excluded from the study. 
To improve reliability of CCTV footage, technological advances in video resolution and 
distance calibration are will be important for achieving better results for comparing pre- and 
post-earthquake performance. However, given that older footage will always be compared 
with newer footage following an earthquake, this limitation is difficult to account for. 
4.9.2 Operator inconsistencies 
As the CCTV procedure is entirely manually operated, there exists considerable differences 
in the habits between different operators. Multiple pipes in the study were surveyed by 
different organisations at different points in time, with different hardware and software 
setups that capture varying levels of information. This can have an adverse effect on the 
reliability of comparing data. 
In CCTV surveys, the operator upon discovering a damage item typically pauses at the 
location to pan the camera for a high-resolution view of the item with respect to the 
surrounding environment. Some pre-CES operators were more thorough in their inspections 
compared to post-CES operators, possibility due to the increased pressure and demand for 
CCTV services within a short timeframe following the CES. This may result in the illusion of 
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more frequent pre-CES damage being reported than post-CES, and the reason why some 
damage items are shown to “disappear” when comparing pre-CES and post-CES footage, 
despite no records of repairs being undertaken. At least 10% of the post-CES surveys are 
considered to be affected in this study. 
It was inferred that some operators conducting post-CES damage surveys did not have 
access to pre-CES observation results, and hence were unaware of the pre-CES damage 
extent. On multiple occasions an existing damage observation was bypassed, which may not 
be obvious at the time due to lighting conditions, flow or other factors. Therefore, it is 
recommended that operators conducting CCTV reports be briefed on the existing damage 
condition of pipes before undertaking a survey. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
The waste water network is considered to be crucial lifeline infrastructure fundamental to 
public health and safety, economic functioning, and the basic operation of any society. 
Improving the resilience of the waste water networks by reducing disaster impacts and 
hence disruption to basic services is a major component of the UNISDR Sendai targets. In 
New Zealand this is reflected by the overarching intent for increased resilience of 
infrastructure as a part of the 2018 Natural Disaster Resilience Strategy. 
In order to contribute towards increased resilience of waste water networks, this thesis has 
outlined a method for assessing the seismic performance of buried gravity waste water 
pipes using existing CCTV data and ground motion information. The aim of the method was 
to develop a systematic approach to compare the pre-existing condition of the pipes with 
additional damage following seismic activity at a high-resolution detail, with the aim of 
attributing local damage observations to external factors from the environment. The need 
for such a method was identified as previous seismic assessments for buried pipework 
overlook pre-existing damage conditions and local effects that may vary along the pipe 
length.  
The method development was feasible due to the extensive, high-resolution geospatial 
databases, and detailed CCTV damage records available in Christchurch, which is regarded 
as the one of the most comprehensive in the world. This was a result of intensive surveys 
conducted by contractors following the CES to reinstate the city’s horizontal infrastructure, 
an event which caused widespread damage to the waste water network on an 
unprecedented scale. 
55 pipes were chosen to demonstrate the potential findings and limitations of the method. 
The selection criteria focused on pipes in residential land use areas and included a diverse 
sample set in terms of pipe installation age, size and ground conditions. The final selection 
was governed by pre-CES and post-CES CCTV inspection records availability at the CCC. The 
pre-CES and post-CES CCTV footage was assessed in accordance with the NZPIM, the 
standardised guidelines for conducting CCTV inspections in New Zealand. The damage items 
identified this way were plotted in GIS software to the nearest metre and compared with 
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geospatial data including ground movements, accelerations, and liquefaction information 
for the identification of relationships and patterns.  
The following results were identified: 
 Main pipe joints and lateral connections were more vulnerable than the pipe body 
during a seismic event. 
 Obvious differential ground movement resulted in increased local damage 
observations in many cases, however this was not obvious for all pipes. 
 Smaller diameter pipes may be more vulnerable than larger pipes during a seismic 
event. 
 Pipes with older installation ages exhibited more overall damage prior to a seismic 
event, which is likely attributable to increased chemical and biological deterioration. 
However, no evidence was found relating pipe age to performance during a seismic 
event. 
 No evidence was found linking levels of pre-CES damage in a pipe with subsequent 
seismic performance. 
 No evidence was found linking seismic performance with liquefaction resistance or 
magnitude of seismic ground motion. 
Due to the small sample size used for method development in this study, trends are not 
clearly pronounced and certain pipe parameters such as age of installation and pipe 
diameter were not able to be effectively represented, so the results are expected to be of 
limited application. However, the advantages associated with the enhanced level of detail 
are evident compared with existing assessment methods, especially with regards to detailed 
pipe performance along the length of a pipe due to local ground deformation evidenced by 
LiDAR experienced through the CES.  
Some study limitations have been discussed, including LiDAR and CCTV processes, the 
relatively subjective nature of defect coding, and reliance on manual operation. It is 
anticipated that developments in data acquisition technology such as AI powered 
image/pattern recognition software will improve accuracies and reduce inconsistencies, for 
example by providing a solution for quantifying defects measured with the CCTV camera. 
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In order to further develop the method presented here, the following areas of focus are 
recommended: 
 A larger and more diverse sample set (i.e. featuring more pipes of various installation 
years and diameters) would better represent various pipe parameters in order to 
further understand associated seismic damage. 
 An improved system to depict continuous effects along a pipe length will better 
reflect the extent of defect types such as surface damage and longitudinal cracking. 
For example, a coloured dashed line could be plotted between two damage points in 
parallel using GIS software. 
 Pipe dips may be incorporated into the method. Dips are often assessed qualitatively 
by observing the angle of the water line in the pipe; however, this was not 
considered in this study due to pre-CES cameras not having the means of measuring 
this, so could not be compared to actual ground deformations and post-CES 
observations. However, it is considered that future CCTV surveys implementing the 
method in this thesis to build a CCTV database are able to take advantage of modern 
sensors and be able to record this information. 
 A systematic and quantitative process for associating damage with above/nearby 
differential ground movement would allow results to be compared more easily than 
the current subjective and qualitative process. This process would account for pipe 
gradient, positional errors in defect locations, and errors in LiDAR-derived ground 
deformation data. An expanded analysis dataset may identify stronger relationships 
between pipe performance and ground deformation. This in turn may aid 
prioritisation of post-earthquake CCTV inspections, and/or inform analyses inferring 
damage to the network in the absence of inspection data. 
 It is currently not possible to attribute specific damage items to individual CES events, 
as the pipe condition footage was captured following multiple earthquakes over the 
span of more than a year. Where CCTV records exist between events, they could be 
incorporated to observe differences in pipe condition between separate events. 
 The current manual process is time-consuming to complete for a large number of 
pipes, and requires the assessor to be competent and trained.  Where possible, steps 
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such as visual examination and data entry could be automated to improve 
completion times and reduce errors due to observation, subjectivity, and fatigue. 
A key lesson from this research is the need for comprehensive, accurate and readily 
accessible CCTV footage of representative parts of the waste water network prior to 
earthquake events, against which post-event impacts can be compared. In addition, local 
territorial authorities should be prioritising LiDAR data capture across their areas, against 
which post-event LiDAR data can be compared. 
The method proposed in this thesis will be useful for any territorial local authority needing 
to assess future earthquake impacts on gravity pipes, to support efforts to increase waste 
water network resilience. In countries other than New Zealand, the local CCTV guidelines 
may be used as a substitute for the NZPIM process described herein. It is able to be applied 
anywhere provided the region has a robust catalogue featuring the buried pipe assets and 
intrinsic parameters, the resources to undertake CCTV analysis of buried pipes, and a GIS 
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Estimated Ground Strain 
Median PGA of events 
between 4 Sep 2010-23 
Dec 2011 
Median PGV of events 
between 4 Sep 2010-23 
Dec 2011 
23532 150 1954 23017 23018 27/02/2014 17/04/2007 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.32 43.61 
8033 150 1955 7439 7440 16/12/2013 10/07/2008 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.19 25.56 
9082 150 1955 9082 9083 17/10/2012 12/01/2010 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.19 26.96 
9088 150 1955 9084 9088 17/10/2012 13/01/2010 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.19 27.23 
9090 150 1955 9089 9090 8/01/2014 13/01/2010 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.19 27.31 
9543 150 1955 9499 9501 9/07/2011 14/09/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.2 31.45 
9544 150 1955 9498 9544 9/07/2011 14/09/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.2 31.44 
9550 150 1955 9501 9550 23/01/2016 15/09/2006 2 0.11–0.16 0.13 50-250 40-200 volumetric = 3%, shear = 2% 0.2 31.41 
22636 150 1955 22102 22121 20/05/2011 1/05/2008 2 0.11–0.16 0.13 50-250 40-200 volumetric = 3%, shear = 2% 0.32 42.45 
17591 150 1956 27234 17108 25/10/2016 11/04/2005 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.3 40.63 
17604 150 1956 27487 17120 13/09/2012 30/06/2008 2 0.11–0.16 0.13 50-250 40-200 volumetric = 3%, shear = 2% 0.3 40.02 
24216 150 1958 23677 23678 5/03/2015 7/12/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.39 48.91 
24217 150 1958 23706 23678 18/10/2012 7/12/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.39 48.84 
24218 150 1958 23680 23678 12/10/2012 4/12/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.39 48.88 
24219 150 1958 24043 23679 29/05/2015 5/12/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.39 48.92 
24220 150 1958 23704 23679 6/03/2015 7/12/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.39 48.86 
24221 150 1958 23679 23680 12/10/2012 4/12/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.39 48.9 
24224 150 1958 23678 23684 18/10/2012 4/12/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.39 48.88 
9125 150 1958 9116 9115 26/10/2016 14/03/2008 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.19 28.65 
9126 150 1958 9114 9115 25/10/2013 14/03/2008 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.19 28.51 
6267 150 1959 5725 5724 11/12/2013 28/12/2007 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.18 20.99 
22329 225 1950 21813 21812 19/10/2017 9/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 37.31 
22330 225 1950 21814 21813 2/09/2011 7/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 37.08 
22331 225 1950 21815 21814 13/08/2011 7/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 36.81 
22333 225 1950 21733 21815 12/08/2011 7/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 36.63 
22352 225 1950 21812 21832 13/09/2011 9/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 37.5 
22353 225 1950 21832 21833 13/09/2011 15/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 37.7 
22354 225 1950 21833 21834 2/09/2011 16/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 37.95 
22355 225 1950 21834 21835 30/08/2011 16/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 38.34 
22356 225 1950 21835 21836 30/08/2011 18/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 38.74 
22357 225 1950 21836 21837 30/08/2011 18/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 39.24 
22358 225 1950 21837 21838 31/08/2011 21/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.29 39.57 
22366 225 1950 21845 21846 31/08/2011 23/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.3 40.2 
22367 225 1950 21846 21847 1/09/2011 23/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.3 40.44 
22368 225 1950 21847 21848 1/09/2011 23/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.3 40.54 
22370 225 1950 21848 22370 13/09/2011 28/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.3 40.62 
22374 225 1951 21851 21853 24/06/2016 28/08/2006 0 <0.065 - >500 >400 volumetric > 5%, shear > 4% 0.3 40.7 
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24086 225 1954 23018 23560 4/10/2017 17/04/2007 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.32 43.69 
23458 225 1958 23007 22943 30/03/2016 16/07/2008 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.32 39.4 
20161 225 1960 19631 19616 10/08/2011 23/05/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.32 40.99 
22372 250 1951 21850 21851 29/01/2017 28/08/2006 1 0.065-0.11 0.065 250-500 200-400 volumetric = 5%, shear = 4% 0.3 40.65 
24284 375 1956 23733 23735 5/01/2015 18/01/2007 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.38 48.1 
22773 450 1952 22256 22250 15/12/2015 19/10/2007 2 0.11–0.16 0.13 50-250 40-200 volumetric = 3%, shear = 2% 0.32 43.06 
22781 450 1952 23269 22258 5/10/2014 18/10/2007 0 <0.065 - >500 >400 volumetric > 5%, shear > 4% 0.32 43.38 
23791 450 1952 23274 23253 2/10/2014 7/07/2006 0 <0.065 - >500 >400 volumetric > 5%, shear > 4% 0.32 44 
10319 450 1956 10236 10238 5/03/2012 6/07/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.22 31.83 
10324 450 1956 10244 10324 10/11/2011 6/07/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.22 31.8 
10326 450 1956 10246 10244 10/11/2011 6/07/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.21 31.76 
1119 450 1960 8589 8591 15/03/2013 6/12/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.22 31.87 
1120 450 1960 8591 8592 15/03/2013 6/12/2006 3 0.16–0.23 0.195 20-50 20-40 volumetric = 1%, shear = 1% 0.22 31.89 
21157 450 1991 20627 20617 28/01/2015 4/07/2006 0 <0.065 - >500 >400 volumetric > 5%, shear > 4% 0.28 36.47 
21165 450 1991 20583 20626 25/01/2015 4/07/2006 0 <0.065 - >500 >400 volumetric > 5%, shear > 4% 0.27 36.12 
21166 450 1991 20626 20627 26/01/2015 4/07/2006 0 <0.065 - >500 >400 volumetric > 5%, shear > 4% 0.28 36.28 
11440 900 1955 11345 11343 19/07/2011 10/02/2010 2 0.11–0.16 0.13 50-250 40-200 volumetric = 3%, shear = 2% 0.21 31.33 
11442 900 1955 11348 11345 20/07/2012 10/02/2010 2 0.11–0.16 0.13 50-250 40-200 volumetric = 3%, shear = 2% 0.21 31.19 
 
  




Figures A-1. Location of pipe selection in Christchurch City, World imagery map layer retrieved from Esri (2018) 
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Appendix B - Pipe Damage Observation List 
The damage observations for the 55 pipes are shown in the following pages. The X-axis 
indicates the distance along the pipe from the designated “starting” manhole to the “finish” 
manhole. The Y-axis of the first chart indicates the magnitude of differential ground 
movement recorded in metres. For each observation the corresponding NZPIM damage 
code is shown at the same distance along the pipe below the chart. The colour coding 
indicates damage severity in accordance with Table 3-2. Pre-CES results are shown as 
squares and post-CESs results are shown as circles as previously mentioned.  
Where applicable the vertical black line shows the distance along the pipe up to which 
footage was available for both the pre- and post-CES CCTV footage, no observations were 




Figures B-1 to B-2. Individual pipe damage observation records 







Figures B-3 to B-6. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 







Figures B-7 to B-10. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 







Figures B-11 to B-14. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 







Figures B-15 to B-18. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 







Figures B-19 to B-22. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 







Figures B-23 to B-26. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 
 







Figures B-27 to B-30. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 







Figures B-31 to B-34. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 
 







Figures B-35 to B-38. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 







Figures B-39 to B-42. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 







Figures B-43 to B-46. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 







Figures B-47 to B-50. Individual pipe damage observation records 
 







Figures B-51 to B-54. Individual pipe damage observation records 
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Appendix C - Pipe Installation Information 


















Figure C-1. Spangler's original bedding configurations for use with the Indirect Method (Al-
Saleem & Langdon, 2015)  
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Bedding Thickness Haunch and Outer 
Bedding 
Lower Side 
Type 1 Do /24 minimum, not less than 3 
in. If rock foundation, use DO 
/12 minimum, not less than 6 in. 
95% Category I 90% Category I, 95% 
Category II. or 100% 
Category III 
Type 2 Do /24 minimum, not less than 3 
in. If rock foundation, use DO 
/12 minimum, not less than 6 in. 
90% Category I or 
Category II 
85% Category I, 90% 
Category II, or 95% 
Category III 
Type 3 Do /24 minimum, not less than 3 
in. If rock foundation, use DO 
/12 minimum, not less than 6 in. 
85% Category I, 90% 
Category II, or 95% 
Category III 
85% Category I, 90% 
Category II, or 95% 
Category III 
Type 4 No bedding required, except if 
rock foundation, use DO /12 
minimum, not less than 6.0 in. 
No compaction 
required, except if 
Category III, use 85% 
Category III 
No compaction 
required except if 
Category III, use 85% 
Category III 
Note. The percentage indicates compaction percent, and the Category is the Soil Category, 
refer Table C-2 
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Table C-2. Equivalent Unified Soil Classification System (USCS) and American Association of 
State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Soil Classifications for Soil 
Designations using standard installations (Al-Saleem & Langdon, 2015) 
 Representative Soil Types Percent Compaction 
SIDD Soil USCS AASHTO Standard Proctor Modified Proctor 
Gravelly Sand 
(Category I) 
SW, SP GW, 
GP 








GM, SM, ML 













CL, MH GC, 
SC 
A5, A6 100 90 
95 85 
90 80 
85 75 
80 70 
45 40 
 
 
